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Introduction 
 
 
 
To claim that 1968 was a global phenomenon is almost a truism nowadays with the 
notion of the “first global revolution of the 20th century“1 becoming common place in 
historiography and popular perceptions.2 Nevertheless, in studying these movements, 
historians have generally kept their focus on the nation state with no systematic 
research of the causes of worldwide synchronicity of the 1968 explosions, nor of their 
global effects.3 On the other hand, recent efforts to establish a transnational 
perspective of 19684 have been limited to investigations of the movements in Western 
Europe and the United States, therefore degrading the events on the periphery of the 
world system to mere echoes of those taking place in the capitalist metropolises.5  
 
The aim of this thesis is to break these molds and focus on the meaning of global 
1968 for the developing countries of the time by comparing two movements arising in 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and Mexico respectively. The 
main objectives of this research are therefore: (1) to locate the socio-economic factors 
that contributed to the birth of these movements by tracing the evolution of economic 
and political systems of both countries and their changing roles within the world 
system, (2) to compare similarities and differences in the way these movements arose 
and organized themselves, (3) to establish a relationship between the 1968 movements 
and the change in Yugoslav and Mexican development paradigms in the 1980’s and 
                                                 
1 The 1848 wave of revolutions often regarded as the first instance of global revolutions. See 
Donatella della Porta, „1968“- Zwischennationale Diffusion und Transnationale Strukturen. 
Eine Forschungsagenda, in Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, 1968-  vom Ereigniss zum Gegenstand der 
Geschichtswissenschaft, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1998, p. 131 
2 Jens Kastner & David Mayer, Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher 
Perspektive Zur Einführung, in Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein 
Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher Perspektiv, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, p. 9 
3 Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert & Detlef Junker, 1968: The World Transformed,  Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 2 
4 See for example: Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, Die 68er Bewegung: Deutschland-Westeuropa-
USA, Verlag C.H. Beck, München, 2001 or Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in 
Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007 
5 Boris Kanzleiter, Die affirmative Revolte 1968 in der Sozialistische Föderation Jugoslawien 
(SFRJ), in Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus 
globalgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, p. 98 
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1990’s and, (4) to highlight certain common features that distinguish these two 
movements in the semi-periphery from those in Western Europe and the United 
States. Following these objectives, my hypothesis is that there is no straight line 
connecting the 1968 movements in Belgrade and Mexico City and the transformations 
these two countries went through in the last two decades of the 20th Century. The 
character of 1968 should not be interpreted in reverse-from eventual consequences.  
 
 
Some remarks on the Personal Approach, Theory and Methodology 
 
I came to the idea for this historical comparison in the winter of 2008 during the 
course of a seminar at the University of Vienna entitled “Education and Revolution in 
1968 and Forty Years Later in a Globalized World“ which focused upon Latin 
America. Reading about the student movement in 1968 Mexico, I noticed motivating 
parallels to the student protest that were happening in my own country, Yugoslavia, 
that same year. The publication of a collection of essays in Vienna in 2008, dealing 
with the 1968 events from a global perspective, which included, among other places, a 
chapter on Yugoslavia, further encouraged me to pursue the topic by offering 
theoretical guidelines and concrete examples of a transnational approach on this 
topic.6 During the process of the research, I became even more struck by the 
similarities revealed by the comparison of these two instances of often overlooked 
1968 episodes. Simultaneously, I developed sensibility for the complexities of each 
case. This duality of cross-continental commonalities and exceptionality of local 
contexts soon emerged as the greatest challenge for my research and the form of the 
narration. 
 
The movements inside Yugoslavia and Mexico, in strict sense, took place in a short 
span between June and October in the summer of 1968, making the time frame of the 
research very tight. Even though these occurrences resonated nation-wide, the center 
stages for the protests were the capital cities. The urban character of the protests and 
the dominant place the capitals occupied in the political and cultural life of both 
countries, allowed me thus to narrow down the spatial frame of the research as well to 
                                                 
6 Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher 
Perspektive, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008 
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Belgrade and Mexico City. Nevertheless, from the early stages of the research it 
became clear that it would be impossible to explain the movements, their origins and 
ultimate consequences if the narrative remained trapped within the 1968 calendar 
year. Instead, I look at the 1968 commotions as the mirror of deeper tectonic shifts 
taking place in the society under the authoritarian façade of the Mexican and 
Yugoslav states and an early sign of profound changes these systems would go 
through over a decade later. 1968 is thus seen as the symbolic borderline between two 
development paradigms or two alternating cyclical time frames in the Braudelian 
sense.7 It is a watershed, representing the peak of one historical period, ushered by 
events taking place between the years 1910-1920 in Mexico and 1941-1945 in 
Yugoslavia, and at the same time, it serves as the temporal starting point for the socio-
economic mutations starting in the early 1980’s in both countries. However, whether 
1968 served as a casual opening gate for these events as well, will need to be 
discovered in the course of this paper. 
 
Kenney and Horn differentiate between comparative histories, which according to 
them, study one or more national cases to highlight that which is unique to each 
individual case and the transnational studies which are interested primarily in the 
connective tissues between the national cases.8 This paper sees no major 
contradictions between these two approaches as it uses comparative analysis between 
two nation states, primarily in order to track the long term processes extending over 
the national borders, but also showing attentiveness to local traditions and 
peculiarities. I tried to achieve this by looking at structural changes in the realm of 
economy and politics characterizing these two developing countries in the 20th 
century and their shifting relationship with the world market.  
 
The thesis is divided accordingly into three distinct chapters describing these 
episodes. Chapter 2 deals with the genesis of the Yugoslav market socialism and the 
Mexican Industrial Substitution Industrialization, as attempts to industrialize national 
economies by detaching them, to a certain degree, from the world market, and the 
                                                 
7 Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century 
Paradigms, Polity Pres, Cambridge, 1991 
8 Gerd-Rainer Horn & Padraic Kenney, Introduction: Approaches to the Transnational, in 
Gerd-Rainer Horn & Padraic Kenney (ed), Transnational moments of Change: Europe 1945, 
1968, 1989, Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2004, p. x 
 7
corresponding political systems overseeing this project. Chapter 3 focuses on the 1968 
movements; their organizational patterns, political demands and the government 
responses. Chapter 4 questions the nature of the linkage between the 1968 movements 
and the economic opening and political liberalization both countries went through in 
the last two decades of the 20th century. Therefore the narrative thread proceeds 
chronologically, while the comparison is kept mostly implicit with a two-track, 
separate progression of both cases, allowing the reader to draw conclusions from this 
parallel story line, only to unify the comparative vision in the end. 
 
Comparison as a method of research asks for transparent epistemology. Apart from 
challenges in organization of the narrative, the set-up of this study demanded clear 
criteria for the selection of two cases observed. Yugoslavia and Mexico shared some 
important characteristics that enhanced their utility for analysis. First, each was hailed 
for their sustained economic growth prior to the 1980’s. They achieved this by 
breaking with the classical economic postulates of open participation in the world 
economy and established new, more autarchic, projects of development. Yugoslavia 
abolished capitalist relations and built up, what I describe, among other scholars, as a 
command economy with controlled elements of the market introduced as an 
incentive.9 Mexico, on the other hand, kept the market at the center of its economic 
life, but boosted a powerful state sector as the main regulator of the system as a 
whole.  
 
Second, both Yugoslavia and Mexico had built up relatively strong and effective 
states and experienced persistent political stability. Yugoslavia developed a one party 
political system with a strong leadership figure on top, coupled with self-management 
organs designed to allow the mass participations of citizens in all areas of life. Mexico 
featured a de-facto one party system with a strong presidency and corporatist 
structures tying various layers of society to the monopolistic party. For decades, both 
systems showcased impressive flexibility in arbitrage between different social 
interests.  
 
                                                 
9  See: Shanti S. Tangri (ed.), Command Versus Demand Systems for Economic Growth, D.C. 
Heath and Company, Boston, 1967, pp. 1-4 
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Third, both societies were marked by a sense of nationalism and historical uniqueness 
stemming from the times of national liberation movements and maintained by 
insistence on sovereignty and the right to an independent model of development in a 
world strictly divided by the Cold War. The closeness of the United States as a 
neighbor in the Mexican case and Yugoslavia’s persistent walk on the thin edge of the 
Iron Curtain constantly reemphasized this sentiment and had a big influence on the 
generation coming of age in the 1960’s. 
 
Fourth, parallel with the movements in Western Europe and the United States, these 
two countries witnessed social mobilizations in 1968. In both cases, seemingly banal 
incidents triggered the first instance of mass mobilizations and government repression 
in the streets after decades of relentless economic growth and political stability in 
both countries. The Mexican events lead to one of the largest tragedy of global 1968- 
when the government forces massacred protesters gathered in the Plaza of Three 
Cultures in Mexico City. In Belgrade, the movement also ended in a unique way when 
President Tito decided publicly to back up the student demands.  
 
Fifth, both countries faced rising foreign debt and major slowdown in the economic 
growth by the beginning of 1980’s. As a result they were forced go down a path of 
deep economic and political reforms in order to regain economic growth. This process 
was followed by the dismantling of old economic and social structures and the rise of 
new ideologies and historical interpretations. The difference in attitudes towards the 
1968 legacy in Serbia and Mexico today opens the opportunity to re-examine the 
assumed connections between the demands of the 1968 movements and the 
transformations taking place in the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
 
Collecting sources for this research proved to be a painstaking endeavor. The study is 
based on secondary sources whose results are synthesized into a comparative 
perspective. The nature of comparison as an approach required a certain symmetry in 
the literature obtained. It was difficult to satisfy this precondition, due to many 
circumstances. First, although my language skills allowed me to read sources in 
Serbo-Croatian, I was unable to do the same with Spanish titles. Language issue and 
limited research funds were also crucial in the decision to conduct part of my research 
in Belgrade and not Mexico City. This imbalance was overcome by the state of 
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writings done on both topics, especially in the English language. There seems to be a 
revival of scholar interest worldwide for 1968 in Mexico since the political changes 
the country has gone through during the presidential elections of 2000, making these 
titles easier to obtain outside of Mexico. In contrast, the scholarship conducted on 
Belgrade events remains in deficit and is limited almost exclusively to domestic 
Serbian scholars.  
 
A further challenge was the difference in categories of inquiry found in two sets of 
literature. The accounting method for measurement of macroeconomic aggregates in 
Yugoslavia at the time did not include the so-called unproductive services such as 
education or health services, therefore making it harder to compare it to the GDP 
standards found in the market economies. Other social and economic forms that 
seemingly corresponded at the first sight proved to hold quite a different meaning 
upon further reading. The collectivized farmer co-operatives of Yugoslav socialism, 
for instance, had quite a different social meaning to the Yugoslav peasants and society 
as a whole, when compared to the Mexican-government promoted ejido system, based 
on the ancient concept of community land. One more example would be difference in 
the schooling systems in both countries which made it hard to compare the age of 
participants and character of institutions inside the student protests. So, what may 
hold true for any comparison is important to acknowledge for my paper as well; 
namely that for any comparative analysis, as heuristically fruitful it might seem there 
are insurmountable, inherent limitations which must always be borne in mind. 
 
Approaching Sources and Literature 
 
My research, on the part of the comparison relating to 1968 in Belgrade, started in 
Vienna University library with attempts to find references to the 1960’s student 
movement in staple books covering the history of Yugoslavia. Most of the newer titles 
dealing with the Yugoslav history are written form the perspective of the 1990’s and 
disintegration of the country, therefore choosing to focus on the nationalist colored 
resistance to the Titoist regime, instead of the left opposition, which was much more 
articulate than the nationalists in the late 1960’s. Hence, from my point of view, those 
titles fail to cover the meaning of 1968 for Yugoslavia. Books written before 1990’s, 
on the other hand, often refuse to recognize the 1968 movement and its insistence on 
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self-management as something separate from the ruling state ideology and thus leave 
little space for its independent analysis. Dennison Rusinow’s famous study of post 
World War II development of Yugoslav socialism, for instance, gives a superb 
overview of social and political developments in the 1960’s, but when it comes to 
1968 protests, it is eager to point out to the “mutually accepted ground rules“10 
between the students and the government. Apart from occasional mentioning in the 
general history books, almost no specific research can be found on the topic; one 
notable exception being the book written by an Australian scholar, Ralph Pervan, in 
the 1970’s. The research through periodicals did not bring much more success. The 
only article on the topic was an eye witness report published on the pages of the New 
Left Weekly a year after the protests.11  
 
This lack of resources in foreign languages led me to conclude that a research in 
Belgrade for more specific titles in Serbo-Croatian would be necessary in order to 
compile a representative sample. An important impulse, however, came already 
before I left Vienna in the form of a collection of essays on 1968 from a global 
perspective, edited by Jens Kastner and David Mayer.12 This proved to be crucial for 
my research in two ways. First, I was able to recognize my own theoretical postulates 
in the framework provided by the editors of this book. Secondly, it contained an essay 
on 1968 movement in Yugoslavia written by a German scholar, Boris Kanzleiter, who 
currently based in Belgrade and finishing his doctorate on the 1968 in Yugoslavia.13 
Apart from that, a two day conference organized by the publisher in an effort to 
promote this monograph in Vienna, in April 2008, presented me with the opportunity 
to get in contact with the aforementioned researchers. Most importantly, consultation 
and tips on literature from Boris Kanzleiter, who already conducted research on this 
topic in Belgrade, made it possible for me to work effectively and make the most out 
of my stay in Serbia. 
 
                                                 
10 Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, Berkley 1977, p.232 
11 D. Plamenić, The Belgrade Student Insurrection. New Left Review, 54, March-April 1969, 
pp. 61-78 
12 Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher 
Perspektiev, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008 
13 Boris Kanzleiter, Die affirmative Revolte 1968 in der Sozialistische Föderation 
Jugoslawien (SFRJ), in Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus 
globalgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, pp.98-114 
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The second part of my research, conducted in Belgrade, consisted of tracing the 
Serbo-Croatian titles that were scattered in libraries across town. Upon my arrival, I 
found the first part of Mihailo Marković’s memoirs, dealing with the 1960’s, was 
displayed in the front window of bookshops, raising hope that the approaching 
fortieth anniversary has motivated publishers and the media to produce some new 
sources on the topic in the meantime. Unfortunately, this was a false first impression. 
Marković’s book soon proved to be a disappointing source with many inaccuracies 
and the main recent development on this topic inside Serbia proved to be the second 
edition of Popov’s classic analysis, written in 1978.14 
 
Disappointing news was also that the Serbian National Library was closed due to 
renovation. Time was thus concentrated on photocopying of materials that were 
scattered like pieces of a puzzle in various smaller libraries. I was very lucky to locate 
two crucial Praxis magazine issues which were missing in most of the libraries. One 
of them containing all the documents issued at the time of the protest and the other 
some of the key texts written from the Praxis school at its creative peak.15  
 
In conclusion, the bibliography on 1968 in Yugoslavia is small in volume. Therefore, 
combining the crucial trip to Belgrade with internet search and Vienna University 
library enabled me to get hold of almost all the secondary sources in existence in 
English and Serbo-Croatian, creating a satisfactory and representative sample. 
 
There is a dearth of material focusing primarily on 1968 in Mexico in English 
language also. Initial efforts, consisting of research through the Centro Intercultural 
de Documentación (CIDOC) archives16 at the Lateinamerika- Institut in Vienna,17 
signaled such a state of affairs. Situated in Mexico at the time and dealing with the 
issue of education, not one CIDOC document addressed the issue directly. Keeping in 
                                                 
14 Nebojša Popov, Društveni Sukobi-Izazov Sociologiji: „Beogradski jun“ 1968, (second 
edition),  Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 2008 
15 Praxis Editorial Board (ed.), Jun-Lipanj 1968: Dokumenti, Zagreb, 1971 and Praxis 
Editorial Board., Trenutak Jugoslavenskog Socijalizma, in Praxis, 3-4, Zagreb, 1971 
16 Lateinamerika-Institut is a research center in Vienna containing the library and document 
materials specialized in Latin America,  http://www.lai.at/bibliothek/cidoc 
17 CIDOC archives represent the material published by the Centro Intercultural de 
Documentación, (1961-1976) founded in Cuarnevaca by the Austrian born philosopher and 
social critic Ivan Illich, http://www.lai.at/bibliothek/cidoc  
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mind the lack of Mexican writings all up until the mid 1980’s and the described 
conditions of public discourse inside the country in various sources18; it became 
obvious that the stifling political climate made such direct analysis impossible to 
produce for a long time. On the other hand, the standard bibliography on the topic, 
published outside of Mexico, exemplified by Poniatowska’s “Massacre in Mexico”, 
focused primarily on auto-biographical respectively essayistic sketches of the hidden 
massacre instead of a more analytical approach.  
 
Research through the journal section of the Vienna University history library proved 
equally futile. For instance, the entire Mexican Studies Journal collection, published 
in California, contains a single article on this topic.19As a result of this, early on in the 
research phase, it became obvious that the topic will have to be, as one would say 
colloquially, approached through the back door, meaning going through the books on 
more general Mexican related topics and looking for 1968 references. This tactic 
proved to be time consuming because of the sheer number of titles one has to go 
through, but fruitful nevertheless. 
 
Textbook titles on the general historical development of Mexico after World War II, 
found in the Vienna University’s history library, proved to contain good sections on 
the 1968 movement, serving as an excellent introduction into the subject.20 The same 
library proved to be quite a good source for the back door approach as further books 
on related topics were discovered that dedicated space to 1968. Political history works 
dealing with the biographies of Mexican presidents21, the Latin American labor 
                                                 
18 Peter H. Smith, Mexico since 1946:Dynamcis of an authoritarian regime, in Leslie Bethell, 
Mexico Since Independence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 361, Enrique 
Krauze, Mexico- Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico 1810-1996, Harper 
Collins Publishers, New York, 1997, pp. 705-715 
19 Diana Sorensen, Tlatelolco 1968: Paz and Poniatowska on Law and Violence, Mexican 
Studies Journal, No. 2, Vol.18, Summer 2002, pp. 297-321 
20 Peter H. Smith, Mexico since 1946:Dynamcis of an Authoritarian Regime, in Leslie 
Bethell, Mexico Since Independence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 321-
397, Roderic Ai Camp, The Time of Technocrats and Deconstruction of the Revolution, in 
Michael C. Meyer & William H. Beezley, (eds.), The Oxford History of Mexico, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 573-673 
21 Enrique Krauze, Mexico- Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico 1810-1996, 
Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 1997 
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movement22 or the history of Mexico City. 23 The University of Vienna Contemporary 
History library contains two additional titles that came to be of great help in the 
research.24   
 
Using this indirect method to discover books and browsing through their footnotes 
and bibliography sections that refer to this particular timeframe - a selection of few 
titles- that focus entirely on the student movement and would form the backbone of 
this study was found.25 Searches on the internet uncovered some unexpected but 
nevertheless very useful sources as well. One American university thesis written for 
the Bachelor degree at the University of Oregon found its way on-line; serving as an 
interesting example of renewed interest in the topic and containing a useful 
bibliography.26  
 
Describing the state of 1968 historiography, Kastner and Mayer warn of the growing 
trend of personal reflections and individualized narrations, encountered in many 
writings, which they find a hindrance to forming a proper historical perspective.27 In 
the context of present-day Serbia, this danger, faced by the scholars in the West, is 
almost negligible. Pressed by its current historical moment, few, in the Serbian public, 
paid any attention to the coming fortieth anniversary of an event so important for 
country’s history.  
 
Since the introduction of the multi-party political system in Yugoslavia, only two new 
books based on the participant’s recollections were published. The first one is a 
recently written memoir by a well known philosopher, politician and a former Praxis 
                                                 
22 Ruth B.Collier & David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Juncture, the Labor 
Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1991 
23 Jonathan Kandell, La Capital: The Biography of Mexico City, Random House, New York, 
1988 
24 Tariq Ali & Susan Watkins, 1968: Marching in the Streets, Bloomsbury Publishing, 
London 1998, p.109, Julia Preston & Samuel Dillon, Opening Mexico: The Making of a 
Democracy, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 2005 
25 Elaine Carey, Plaza of Sacrifices: Gender, Power and Terror in 1968 Mexico, University of 
New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 2005 and Donald J. Mabry, The Mexican University and 
the State: Student Conflicts, 1910-1971, Texas A&M University, College Station, 1982 
26 Kara M. Borden, Mexico 1968: An Analysis of the Tlatelolco Massacre and it’s Legacy, 
University of Oregon, Eugene, 2005 
27 Jens Kastner, David Mayer (Hg.), Weltwende 1968? Ein Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher 
Perspektive, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, p. 8 
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group member Mihailo Marković.28 Alongside this effort, a journalistic collection of 
remembrances and interviews with 1968 participants was published in 2003, but 
nevertheless remained virtually ignored by academia or the public.29  
 
These two books embody all of the potential shortcomings that Kastner and Mayer 
refer to. Most specifically Marković’s account of the movement’s demands and his 
personal involvement are formulated to fit the spirit of the current political climate 
inside Serbia.30 A glimpse at the content found inside the original Praxis magazine 
articles and acomparison to present re-interpretations by the same authors clearly 
shows this tendency towards revision.31 
 
Surprisingly enough, loosening of the censorship grip, previously exercised by the 
Titoist regime, encouraged almost no attempts to articulate new perspectives on this 
topic. The year 1990 brought to light two previously banned publications.32 This 
initial output remained isolated however, as no new efforts to produce a revised 
account of 1968 in Yugoslavia have been made in the years to follow. The year 2008 
saw one of these studies re-published and accompanied additionally by a collection of 
documents following the case of the main student paper associated with the revolt.33 
Just how serious the lack of fresh resources remains is mirrored by the fact that two 
most serious and most often cited works on the topic in Serbo-Croatian were written 
back in the years 1978 and 1984.34  
 
In 1978 former Praxis member and social researcher Nebojša Popov compiled the 
most authoritative source on 1968 in Yugoslavia to that date. This sociological 
analysis locates the main actors of the conflict and provides an overview of key 
                                                 
28 Mihailo Marković, Juriš na nebo, Prosveta, Beograd, 2008 
29 Ivan Miladinović, 1968: Tajna i opomena, Draganić, Beograd, 2003 
30 See for example Marković’s recapitulation of student demands, Mihailo Marković, Juriš na 
nebo, Prosveta, Beograd, 2008, p.40 
31 Praxis Editorial Board (ed.), Jun-Lipanj 1968: Dokumenti, Zagreb, 1971 and Praxis 
Editorial Board., Trenutak Jugoslavenskog Socijalizma, in Praxis, No. 3-4, Zagreb, 1971 
32 Nebojša Popov, Društveni Sukobi-Izazov Sociologiji: „Beogradski jun“ 1968, (second 
edition),  Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 2008 and  Pavlović, Ž., Ispljuvak pun krvi, Dereta, 1990 
33 Popov’s second edition and Ilija Moljković, „Slučaj“ Student, Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 
2008 
34 Nebojša Popov, Društveni Sukobi-Izazov Sociologiji: „Beogradski jun“1968, (second 
edition), Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 2008 and Mirko Arsić, Dragan R. Marković. ’68. 
Studentski bunt i društvo, Beograd, 1984 
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political consequences, placed in the historical context of industrialization of 
Yugoslav society.35  The book was banned by the Titoist authorities, but the 
manuscript was widely read around the dissident circles until it was finally published 
openly in 1990 with its second edition coming out recently. The second publication is 
a journalistic account, published by Mirko Arsić and Dragan R. Marković in 1984, as 
a retrospective view of 1968 enabled by the liberalizing political atmosphere inside 
Yugoslavia in the eighties.36  
 
The state of literature in foreign languages is not much better. There are only a few 
titles written by left leaning researchers in the English language, with a personal 
interest in Yugoslavia in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. They consist of an informative 
article written by a Yugoslav scholar in the 1969 March issue of the New Left Review 
magazine37 and a well-researched attempt to connect the 1968 movement to 
deteriorating social conditions of the Yugoslav student population, written by an 
Australian scholar in 1978.38 Finally, a classic analysis of the development of 
Yugoslav socialism after the Second World War, written by Rusinow in 1977, also 
dedicates a few pages to the student revolt.39 
 
Despite the boom of titles on the history of the SFRY, published in the 1990’s, few, if 
any, have dedicated time to the issue of the 1960’s student movement. Sunić, for 
instance, connects dissidence in former Yugoslavia exclusively with nationalist 
opposition to the ruling ideology of pan-Yugoslavism.40, England based scholar, Jasna 
Dragović-Soso, does dedicate a few pages to the New Left opposition circles, but 
                                                 
35 It was followed by an account of the struggle over the expulsion of a group of Belgrade 
university professors associated with the 1968 movement written by the same author, Nebojša 
Popov, Contra Fatum: Slučaj grupe profesora filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu1968-1988, 
Niro "Mladost“, Beograd, 1989 
36 Another interesting contribution on the topic by Marković can be found in the publication 
commemorating the 150th anniversary of University of Belgrade, Dragan R. Marković, 
Demonstracije 1968. godine, in Univerzitet u Beogradu 1838-1988, Beograd 1988. 
37 D. Plamenic, The Belgrade Student Insurrection, New Left Review, 54, March-April 1969. 
38 Ralph Pervan, Tito and the Students, The University and the University Student in Self-
Managing Yugoslavia, University of Western Australia Press, 1978 
39 Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, Berkley 1977, pp.229-239 
40 Tomislav Sunić, Titoism and Dissidence: Studies in the History and Dissolution of 
Communist Yugoslavia, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1995 
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decides to concentrate on the nationalists.41 The logical question therefore arises: why 
has the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain failed to inspire a wave of new interest 
in 1968 inside Serbia, similar to that interest in other countries? Similarly, why did 
foreign researchers fail to unearth this occurrence during the general re-
contextualizing of Cold War events in the 1990’s? 
 
According to Kanzleiter, the 1968 movement in Belgrade, with its clearly anti-
nationalist stance and criticism of the ruling party policies from the left, stands at odds 
with all the dominant discourses in Serbia since the late eighties.42 No social force in 
the Serbian society today is capable or wiling to include these events into its legacy 
and bring it back into the public memory.  Robertson, on his part, compares the 
difference in treatment received by the Belgrade June and the Prague Spring in 
contemporary historiography of 1968. He claims that, as opposed to Prague, a pro-
socialist program was so well articulated in the Belgrade case, that any attempt to 
incorporate the event into a mainstream “liberal-utopian narrative” 43 proves futile. 
The summer of 1968 in Belgrade can hardly be presented as a factor that has led to 
the fall of communism. As a result, 1968 in SFRY is often constructed as being 
friendlier to the ruling structures in comparison to other movements, or that it 
functioned according to the logic of Stalinism, thus rendering it historically obsolete. 
 
This void was taken advantage of by a new generation of young non-Yugoslav 
scholars who only recently started to rediscover the 1968, “between East and West”44 
and explore it anew in the spirit of comparison and global historical perspective. The 
graduation thesis, written by an Australian James Robertson, lucidly compares the 
student movements in 1968 and 1997 in Belgrade, overcoming the lack of secondary 
sources by conducting a series of interviews with the former participants of both 
                                                 
41 Jasna Dragović-Soso, „Spasioci nacije“-Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljavanje 
nacionalizma, Fabrika Knjiga, Beograd, 2004, pp.48-58 
42 Boris Kanzleiter, Die affirmative Revolte 1968 in der Sozialistische Föderation 
Jugoslawien (SFRJ), in Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus 
globalgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, p.112. 
43 James Robertson, Discourses of Democracy and Exclusion in the Streets of Belgrade ,1968 
– 1997, University of  Sydney, 2006 
44 Boris Kanzleiter, Die affirmative Revolte 1968 in der Sozialistische Föderation 
Jugoslawien (SFRJ), in Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus 
globalgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, p.106 
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movements.45 German scholar, Boris Kanzleiter, on the other hand, takes advantage 
of the opened state archives in Belgrade and produces one of the most well rounded 
accounts in an article form as a prelude to a full pledged dissertation.46 This thesis 
attempts to connect itself to these recent reexaminations of 1968 in Yugoslavia and its 
meaning from the global perspective. 
 
Events that took place in Mexico City in the summer of 1968 also remained relatively 
untouched by academic research until recently. Inside Mexico, the governmental 
cover up of the Tlatelolco massacre and the continuous rule of  Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), all up until the year 2000, made it hard for 
journalists and scholars to venture into the matter and question the official 
presentation of the events. On the other hand, researchers outside Mexico 
concentrated their efforts mostly on the revolutionary period between 1910 and 1930 
or the so called democratization period in the 1980’s; thus skipping the presumably 
not so challenging decades between 1945 and 1970 of state led development when 
economic and political system seemed extremely stable. 
 
Those who chose to explore the 1968 phenomena however, too often got caught up 
solely in the act of Tlatelolco massacre itself and the hidden facts surrounding this 
tragic event. This is itself an understandable trend as the event and its manifold 
victims belong to those traumatic ruptures in the historical course of a society that 
lead activists and journalists to demand recognition, justice and the persecution of the 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity.47 The consequence of such a legitimate 
approach, however, might be that the more general historical context of the movement 
is underrepresented.48 Only a few attempts have been made, outside of Mexico, to 
connect the massacre and the movement to broader historical trends, among those a 
                                                 
45 James Robertson, Discourses of Democracy and Exclusion in the Streets of Belgrade , 1968 
– 1997, University of Sydney, Sydney, 2006, p.90 
46 Boris Kanzleiter, Die affirmative Revolte 1968 in der Sozialistische Föderation 
Jugoslawien (SFRJ), in Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus 
globalgeschichtlicher Perspektiv, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, pp. 98-114. 
47 See for example the activities of the 1968 remembrance committee in Mexico: 
http://mx.geocities.com/comite68ac/frames/began.html 
48 See for example: Elena Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico, University of Missouri Press, 
Missouri, 1992 
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Marxist interpretation of Judith A. Hellman49 and Donald J. Mabry’s often cited 
history of movements in Mexican universities .50   
 
Since the year 2000, and the resurface of the Tlatelolco controversy in the Mexican 
politics and the media51, there seems to be a new wave of interest for 1968 events and 
literature on the topic exemplified by an analysis of Carey which takes a feminist 
perspective52 and that of Borden.53 However, in the spirit of post-structural writings, 
many of these books, articles and exhibitions concentrate on the individual 
experiences, cultural influences, literature discourse analysis or gender.54   
 
Never before had scholars access to such an abundance of data, about this turning 
point in Mexico’s history, at their reach. Nevertheless, there is a real danger that by 
focusing on various particularities and narrow aspects of the movement, such as: 
personal biographies, agents of power, executor’s confessions, gender roles, media 
presentations, foreign element etc. the more general historical narrative will get lost in 
the sea of new specialized information. The prime task of this thesis would therefore 
be to try and utilize the information coming out in public recently and try to 
synthesize and connect them into a more traditional theoretical framework of societal 
dynamics in developing countries in general and Mexico’s experience in particular.  
 
Furthermore, unlike many of the previous attempts to shed light on 1968 in Mexico, 
the paper will try to escape “the trap of Tlatelolco” — meaning reducing the 
movement that lasted for months to one afternoon. In other words, for the sake of 
                                                 
49 Judith A.Hellman, Mexico in Crisis, Holmes & Meier Publisher Inc., New York, 1983 
50 Donald J. Mabry, The Mexican University and the State: Student Conflicts, 1910-1971, 
Texas A&M University, College Station, 1982 
51 Tim Golden, Mexico City Journal; 1968, Soaked in Student Blood, Refuses to Fade, The 
New York Times, Monday, July 28, 2008, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE6D91E39F935A35753C1A965958260  
52 Elaine Carey, Plaza of Sacrifices: Gender, Power and Terror in 1968 Mexico, University of 
New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 2005 
53 Kara M. Borden, Mexico 1968: An Analysis of the Tlatelolco Massacre and it’s Legacy, 
University of Oregon, Eugene, 2005 
54 See: Diana Sorensen, Tlatelolco 1968: Paz and Poniatowska on Law and Violence in: 
Mexican Studies Journal, No. 2, Vol.18, Summer 2002, pp. 297-321, Victoria Carpenter, 
Tlatelolco 1968 in Contemporary Mexican Literature: Introduction in: Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2005, pp.476-480 or Herbert Braun, Protests of 
Engagement: Dignity: False Love, and Self-Love in Mexico during 1968 in: Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 39, No.3, July 1997,  pp. 511 – 549 
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broader perspective, not much time will be spent trying to uncover the exact number 
of deaths, army units involved in the killings, the chain of command or search for 
personal responsibility inside the government. The massacre will be dealt with only as 
the last stop of a long process with many twists and turns on the way that might have 
influenced the final outcome. The same principle applies to the examination of the 
role of the approaching Olympic Games to which authors often dedicate much space 
in their research and commonly use it as the decisive factor sealing the fate of the 
movement.55  
 
Unlike the older works, that have the tendency to pick one outside factor that in return 
determines the movement as a whole (government brutality or the Olympic Games to 
take but two examples) or the newer ones, which show no ambition to construct 
certain causality and simply map all the factors in one plane, this thesis will try to 
locate dependent and independent variables inside the movement itself and bond them 
to more general dynamics of the Mexican society at that time and the global 
phenomena of 1968 student movements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 See for example: Kara M. Borden, Mexico 1968: An Analysis of the Tlatelolco Massacre 
and it’s Legacy, University of Oregon, Eugene, 2005, pp. 19-25 
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Chapter 1: Debates and Positions 
 
 
The international dimension of 1968 is commonly shaped in a particular fashion. 
According to Horn and Kenney, “the larger the net is cast, the more prominent 
become the feature of 1968 as youth rebellion and/or cultural revolt at the expense of 
any serious discussion of radical politics, or, even more so, the element of working- 
class revolt”56 This cultural approach often focuses on the role of media and sees the 
changes in music, fashion, lifestyles and artistic trends heading the agenda. There is 
nothing wrong in this approach by itself. Still, as Immanuel Wallerstein points out, the 
1970’s have shown that it is very easy to dissociate counterculture from political 
activity and socio-economic transformations and turn it into the consumption oriented 
lifestyles.57 Another dominant tendency is to frame the historical experience into the 
destinies of single actors and their intimate descriptions, thus providing a multitude of 
different interpretations and meanings to events.58 Again, this approach, robs the 1968 
of its radical edge and transformation potential. It leads to a detaching of the narrative 
from any major consequences or larger meanings.  
 
As an alternative model for the study of 1968, Kastner and Mayer propose four 
maxims: (1) broaden the limited focus on the Western metropolises, (2) move away 
from the students as the single participants, (3) displace the narrative from the 1968 
calendar year and look at the longer lasting cycles instead and, (4) disassociate from 
individualized memories of the participants and continue towards a critical 
historicizing.59  
 
                                                 
56 Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Working class Dimension of 1968, in Gerd-Rainer Horn & Padraic 
Kenney (ed), Transnational moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989, Rowan & 
Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2004, p. 97 
57 Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 71 
58 Juliane Schumacher & Sherin Abu Chouka, Erinnerungen im leeren Raum, Lateinamerika 
Nachrichten, 406, April 2008, p.44 
59 Jens Kastner & David Mayer, Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher 
Perspektive Zur Einführung, in Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein 
Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, pp. 7-21 
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This thesis attempts to apply these maxims in practice by picking out two developing 
countries on the semi-periphery of the world capitalist system and placing their 1968 
movement in a broader perspective of national liberation, industrialization, 
urbanization, state structures, rise of the New Left and the ruling ideologies. In the 
modern era, political and cultural movements, even as they are still rooted within the 
frame of a nation state, consciously or unconsciously embrace similar experiences or 
express similar aspirations across national borders.60 1968 is a good example for these 
phenomena. This study recognizes the global character of 1968 by drawing parallels 
between Yugoslavia and Mexico and identifying socio-economic structures and 
processes that are supranational in essence. In this way the factors that are considered 
crucial in the local framework might turn out to be incidental when placed next to 
other similar experiences elsewhere61, at the same time, comparison, as a method, 
offers an opportunity for full appreciation of national distinctiveness by bringing the 
contrasts the fore. 
 
In order to understand the political outlook, demands and achievements of the 
movements, the paper will look at key peculiarities of the Mexican bourgeois 
corporatist state and the Yugoslav self-management brand of socialism and explore 
how these macro frames influenced the dynamics of various social classes. Special 
attention will be given to the labor movements, the rising middle layers and 
differentiations taking place within the seemingly monolithic ruling elite. In this way, 
more light will be cast on the meaning of 1968 for the countries on the semi-periphery 
of the world system and synthesize their experiences. This is crucial if one wants to 
establish these movements as autochthon occurrences with their own genesis and 
background, instead of mere echoes of the events in the West. 
 
According to Donatella della Porta, communication of social movements over 
national borders in the 1960’s, did not develop within organized networks of 
                                                 
60 Gerd-Rainer Horn & Padraic Kenney, Introduction: Approaches to the Transnational, in 
Gerd-Rainer Horn & Padraic Kenney (ed), Transnational moments of Change: Europe 1945, 
1968, 1989, Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2004, p. x 
61 Gerd-Rainer Horn & Padraic Kenney, Introduction: Approaches to the Transnational, in 
Gerd-Rainer Horn & Padraic Kenney (ed), Transnational moments of Change: Europe 1945, 
1968, 1989, Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2004, p. xiii 
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exchange.62 The contacts did not follow any rational structure. Contrary to this 
assessment, done with much more intense contacts of later-on social movements in 
mind, it might be pointed out that direct contact, exchange of patterns in 
organizational forms and experiences was common already in 1968 between the 
neighboring countries such as Italy and France or well connected industrialized 
societies as it was the case with Germany and the United States for example. As we 
will see, these types of direct contacts played a role inside the countries with 
relatively closed regimes, such as Yugoslavia and Mexico as well.  
 
This mutual exchange has to be reflected in the light of the role played by the mass 
media, political and philosophical literature, decolonization, anti-imperialism, 
socialist humanism, fiction, music and political turning points, such as the split 
between Yugoslavia the Comintern or the Cuban Revolution. Specific historical, 
cultural and political structures, like the traditions of the organized left in each 
country, also played an important role here, influencing the local movements to 
engross and stress on certain aspects of the global 1968 and marginalize others. 
 
In an effort to establish a dividing line between the 1968 movements in the periphery 
and the center, the dominant assumptions about the ultimate outcomes of the 1968 
have to be challenged as well. Despite the obvious failure of the 1968 movements to 
change political status quo, many authors insist on the eventual triumph of its legacy 
in the form of changing personal relations, dominant gender roles, liberalization of 
everyday life, modernizing economy, changing mentalities etc.63 However, it is 
important to keep in mind that these views come from a narrow North American and 
West European perspective. As Kastner and Mayer note, not only that many of these 
aspirations of 1968 still remain unimplemented, but one must also state clearly that 
the majority of the world never profited form these reforms ascribed to 1968 in the 
West.64 In this sense, the hypothesis that 1968 somehow automatically lead to socio-
                                                 
62 Donatella della Porta, „1968“- Zwischennationale Diffusion und Transnationale 
Strukturen. Eine Forschungsagenda, in Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, 1968-  vom Ereigniss zum 
Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1998, p. 149 
63 Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System, 
Cmbridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 74 
64 Jens Kastner & David Mayer, Weltwende 1968?: Ein Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher 
Perspektive Zur Einführung, in Jens Kastner & David Mayer (eds.), Weltwende 1968?: Ein 
Jahr aus globalgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Mandelbaum Verlag, Vienna, 2008, p. 21 
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economic changes in Yugoslavia and Mexico in the early 1980’s has to be re-
examined. This study therefore aspires to reinvigorate the emancipatory potential and 
political meaning of 1968 by inspecting the concrete forms of organizing from below 
and their successes/failures to influence history. There is no natural, straight-line 
progress of history from 1968 to the present, what this paper offers in exchange is the 
sketch of the battle of the living forces in the context of changing local and global 
structures. 
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Chapter 2: Converging Systems 
 
 
2.1 Great Transformations 
 
A glimpse at the topography behind Yugoslav and Mexican 1968 movements reveals 
a striking similarity of environments in which they arose. Le Corbusier-inspired 
student dormitories in New Belgrade65 and Tlatelolco housing blocks, located in the 
center of modern Mexico City, served as road signs for a seemingly unstoppable road 
towards modernity that both countries had embarked upon. In a bipolar global order, 
where majority of peripheral countries were forced to choose between two rival 
concepts of development, the Yugoslav path to socialism and Mexican Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) represented two mavericks on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain. Yugoslavia was the first country in the Soviet sphere of influence to 
defy the powerful grip of Stalinism and awaken the hope for alternative roads to 
socialism. Mexico seemed to be one of the foremost Latin American countries 
capable of partly escaping the century old political and economic dependence from 
the United States by building powerful sovereign political system and nationally 
responsible protectionist economy. Both cases were looked upon as success stories of 
the time. They were seen by many as living proofs that an underdeveloped society can 
bypass economic and political subordination and try catching up with privileged 
industrialized world by rallying its internal forces and choosing its own independent 
path.  
 
2.1. (1) The Balkans Transformed 
 
A unified state, created after the World War I, encompassing various South Slavic 
people in the Balkans under a Serbian monarch, was a rural society believed to be 
lagging far behind modern West-European standards of its days. In 1938, per capita 
                                                 
65 New Belgrade was the most ambitious project of the post World War II Yugoslav 
authorites to expand the old Belgrade to the left bank of the Sava river by turning  the swamp 
terrain into a modern representative capital of the new socialist state. Over 100,000 volunteers 
organized from all over the freshly liberated country took part in the building process. 
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national income has been estimated to stand between US$60 and $70.66 Society was 
dominated by subsistence farming peasantry which made up 75 percent of total 
population. Agriculture occupied a central role, contributing over 50 percent to 
Yugoslavia’s GDP in all the decades up until the World War II.67 Manufacturing 
accounted for mere 25.9 percent of the national income.  Trade structure reveals a 
typical underdeveloped economy. Yugoslav exports, limited to a few specialized 
agricultural products and raw materials such as cattle, fresh fruits, tobacco and timber 
were directed towards the country’s Western European neighbors, while industrial 
products were imported in return at highly unfavorable terms of trade.68 Small 
domestic industrial sector was dominated by foreign capital which held over 60 
percent of industrial shares in Yugoslavia in 1939.69 Only 30.1 percent of children of 
the primary school age were attending school, while 40.6 percent of the population 
was illiterate.70  
 
By the end of 1960’s, the proportions described had been turned upside down. The 
year 1971 saw the National Income per capita achieving the level of $870, while the 
average Real Social Product71 growth of 9.3 percent positioned Yugoslavia among the 
world’s fastest growing economies in the period between 1953 and 1960.72 Part of the 
population engaged in the agriculture had decreased from 70 percent in 1948 to 39 
percent of total population in 1970. By 1970’s, the volume of industrial output 
increased six times over and industrial products amounted for 86 percent of total 
                                                 
66 In comparison, that same year U.S. per capita national income level was $521, Germany’s 
stood at $337 and France’s at $236. 
67 Dragutin V. Marsenić, Ekonomika Jugoslavije, Beograd 2000, pp.78-83 
68 Germany, Austria and Italy constituted the prime markets for imports and exports 
69 Radovan Kovaćević, Ekonomski odnosi Jugoslavije sa insotranstom, Ekonomski fakultet 
Beograd, 2003, p.60 
70 Denisson Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, Berkeley 1977, p.xviii 
71 It is important to note here that the Yugoslav definition of the Social Product differed from 
the standard definition of GDP in the market economies by excluding the value of ‘non 
material’ services such as education, health, culture etc. The difference between these two 
aggregates therefore depended on the change in accounting classifications, the number of 
people employed in these excluded services and their pay. Lydall estimates that in the 1970’s 
this difference went little over 10 percent of the Social Product, then gradually falling in the 
1980’s. Despite this differentiation, the Real Social Product can indicate the main trends and 
proportions in a comparison with the Mexican data and this paper uses it interchangeably with 
the GDP figures. See: Harold Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, 
p.42 and Dragutin V. Marsenic, Ekonomika Jugoslavije, Beograd 2000, p. 29 
72 Nebojša Popov, Društveni Sukobi-Izazov Sociologiji: „Beogradski jun“ 1968, (second 
edition),  Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 2008, p. 127 
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exports. Almost all of the population between the ages of 7-14 was included into 
primary education and already by the mid 1960’s only the United States and the 
USSR could claim a larger share of students per 10,000 inhabitants in the world.73 
Total student population rose from 15,505 at the outbreak of the Second World War 
to 140,647 in 1968.74 
 
2.1. (2) Mexico Transformed 
 
Mexico’s transformation was equally impressive. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
various attempts to modernize the society, under the rule of Porfirio Díaz, by opening 
up the economy to foreign capital investment, produced a distorted social and 
economic landscape. The ruling laissez-faire ideology created capital intensive export 
enclaves as poles of growth while at the same time there was no internal market able 
to accommodate the vast majority of artisans and peasants uprooted from the 
traditional economy.75 By 1900, foreign investors76 held around 90 percent of 
incorporated value of the Mexican industry and some150 million of the country’s 485 
million acres of farming surfaces.77 Mexico engaged in liberal international trade, 
with the railroad system constructed to take the raw materials such as oil, rubber, 
sugar and henequen out of the country while, at the same time, it became dependant 
on the import of the finished products. All the way up until the end of the 1930’s, 
more than 65 percent of the workforce toiled in the countryside, while illiteracy index 
stood at 66.59 per cent of the population.78  
 
By the end of the 1960’s, the Mexican government could look back and proclaim its 
achievements as a sovereign state with one of the most advanced economies of the 
developing world. In 1971, per capita income has reached $700. Between 1940 and 
                                                 
73 The United States were first with 210.9 students per 10 000 inhabitants, the USSR second 
with 107.7, Yugoslavia third with 85.1, see: Veljanovski Rade, Komparacija Studentskog 
Pokreta 1968-1991/92 godine, Fakultet Političkih Nauka, Beograd, 1995, p.30 
74 Ralph Pervan,Tito and the Students: The University and The University Student in Self-
Managing Yugoslavia, University of Western Australia Press, Nedlands, 1978, p.69 
75 John M. Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution, 
University of California Press, Berkley, 1987, pp. 176-186 
76 Some 70 pecent of these investments came from the U.S. 
77 John M. Hart, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920, in Michael C. Meyer & William H. 
Beezley, (eds.), The Oxford History of Mexico, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p.436 
78 Jamie B. Torres, Education in a Young State (Mexico) With an Ancient Culture, CIDOC 
Cuaderno, No. 38, Vol. 3, Cuarnevaca 1964, p.3 
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1970, the GDP grew by an average annual increase of 6.4 percent.79 During this time, 
the agricultural share in the national economy fell to 11.6 percent, whilst industry 
became the cornerstone of growth with its output amounting to 34.4 percent of the 
national GDP.80 Less than half of Mexicans were agricultural workers and the 
majority of the population was employed in industry, commerce, finance and 
services.81 In 1968, enrollment in Mexican universities nationwide reached 350,000— 
a sevenfold increase since the 1930’s. Illiteracy index was down to 28.9 percent of the 
population whereas Mexico had 82.6 students per 10 000 inhabitants by 1970.82 
 
2.2 Revolutions and the States 
   
The roots of both of these transformations can be traced back to the revolutionary 
movements whose victories against the old orders cleared the way for the ensuing 
reforms. The Yugoslav and Mexican Revolutions were processes of epic proportions. 
They would eventually become historical benchmarks against which all economic, 
social and political policies would be measured up in these two countries until the 
very end of the 20th century. The Yugoslav Revolution83 took place during the course 
of World War II, in the struggle of national liberation against the fascist occupation 
and domestic collaborators. Between 1941 and 1945, the country had suffered 
1,700,00084 dead, amounting to 11 percent of total prewar population; a proportionate 
                                                 
79 John W. Sherman, The Mexican “Miracle”and Its Collapse, in Michael C. Meyer & 
William H. Beezley, (eds.), The Oxford History of Mexico, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2000, p.582 
80 Miguel D Ramirez, Mexico’s Economic Crisis: Its Origins and Consequences, Praeger, 
New York, 1989, p.54 
81 Judith A.Hellman, Mexico in Crisis, Holmes & Meier Publisher, New York, 1983, p.56 
82 Torres, J.B. , Education in a Young State (Mexico) With an Ancient Culture, CIDOC 
Cuaderno, No. 38, Vol. 3, Cuarnevaca 1964, p.3 
83 In the Yugoslav post-World War II historiography, the term ‘revolution’ became the norm 
when referring to events taking place between the years 1941 and 1945. Many foreign 
scholars also choose this term in order to indicate the sharp discontinuity with the past social 
institutions, mass mobilization and the sheer level of social, economic and political changes in 
such a short time. See for instance: Bogdan D. Denitch, The Legitimation of a Revolution: 
The Yugoslav Case, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1976, p. 2 or Paul Shop, The 
Yugoslav Revolution: The First of a New Type, in Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy 
of Communist Takeovers, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1975, pp. 244-273 
84 New studies tend to show that this figure, published by the Yugoslav authoritires shortly 
after the World War II, was exegerated, proposing instead that the number of casualties was 
closer to 1,014,000 people. See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties#endnote_Yugo 
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loss second only to that of Poland.85 Starting in 1910, as an uprising against the 
dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz and spanning over ten years with the death toll 
of approximately 1,500,000 people, the Mexican Revolution was about to become one 
of the bloodiest conflicts ever witnessed in the Americas.86 Whether through family 
history or institutional framework, there was hardly any Yugoslav or Mexican citizen, 
in the 1960’s, whose social existence was not connected, to a certain degree, with this 
revolutionary period. 
 
The main consequences of these historical watersheds were mirrored in the achieved 
level of economic and political sovereignty, land reform, nationalization of resources, 
industrialization, separation between the church and the state, eradication of illiteracy 
and construction of national unity. All of this was undertaken with an ever increasing 
role of the state in society. A firm state, substituting the narrowness of private 
interests in the laissez-faire market, was seen as the sole agent capable of pushing the 
revolutionary project further in a hostile environment and advancing the society as a 
whole. Both movements were eventually institutionalized through single political 
parties which managed to exercise their monopoly over the state apparatus for 
decades. 
 
2.2 (1) Tito’s Partisans 
 
In the Yugoslav case, the revolutionary process was lead, from the very beginning, by 
the Communist Party as the only political force capable of uniting the population 
across national and religious borders and effectively fighting the fascist occupiers.87 
Formed in 1921 and consequently molded in Stalinist fashion in the 1930’s, the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia88, lead by Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), helped 
organize a successful resistance to fascist occupation and eventually came out of the 
war as the strongest political force in the country. With the old monarchist state 
                                                 
85 Denisson Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, University of California Press, 
Berkeley 1977, p.19 
86 Judith A. Hellman , Mexico in Crisis, Holmes & Meier Publisher Inc., New York, 1983, p.1 
87 Ann Lane, Yugoslavia: When Ideals Collide, Palgrav Macmillan, New York, 2004, p.81 
88 Since 1920, the official name of the party was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In 
1952, after a break with Stalin, the party changed its name to the  League of Communists of 
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apparatus either in exile or discredited through collaboration with the fascists, the 
communists had no serious problems in radically altering the old social order.  
 
Enjoying unmatched prestige and popular support, the Partisans immediately 
proclaimed a republic, conducted an agrarian reform and confiscated all industry 
formerly controlled by the German capital and large entrepreneurs who collaborated 
with the occupational regime. As a result, even before the official nationalization laws 
were passed, the old possessing class was divorced form its economic power with 
close to 80 percent of the industry passing into the hands of the state. By 1947, all 
industries of national importance, banks and the retail sector, including cultural and 
health institutions, were nationalized. Private property was limited to agrarian 
holdings up to ten hectares, handcrafts and some trade. The groundwork was prepared 
for elimination of the market and introduction of planned economy based on the five 
year plans.89  
 
The Communist Party introduced a political monopoly over the state. Pre-war 
parliamentary parties were marginalized, actively sabotaged and eventually outlawed. 
All political power was centralized and distributed internally, according to the place 
occupied in the Party hierarchy. The Yugoslav state began to resemble the Soviet 
model by turning into a single gigantic monopolistic trust encompassing all spheres of 
society. A new structure was established with single, upward channels of social 
mobility which was accomplished mainly through mechanisms of cooptation. On the 
top of the party pyramid, stood the powerful figure of Josip Broz Tito, as the supreme 
arbiter over different wings of the nomenklatura.90  
 
Forced collectivization of small peasant holdings was attempted through introduction 
of state-owned agricultural collectives. On the other hand, the working class, in the 
state run enterprises, was incorporated into a single trade union confederation which 
behaved like a transmission belt for the government plans with little or no 
independence.91 Soviet educated economic planers insisted that industrial production 
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demands an army-like control with a single line of communication from top to 
bottom. With the royal court and the entrepreneurial class out of the frame, the new 
government was supposed to represent the working class and the peasantry. However, 
with no democratic channels for expression and poorly organized, their participation 
in the new organs of power was blocked by the bureaucratic layer growing out of the 
Communist Party and the Partisan army.  
 
In 1952, shortly after the split with Stalin, one of Tito’s closest collaborators, Milovan 
Đilas (1911–1995), theoretically condemned Soviet system for being dominated by a 
ruling caste standing above society. According to Đilas, this layer lived off the surplus 
value produced by the workers but, unlike the capitalist class, it does not own the 
means of production and therefore reproduces itself through political privileges. 
Hence, this caste has no historical perspective and will be eliminated once the 
working class takes political control.92 Just a few years later, Djilas would be purged 
from the Party as he publicly proclaimed that, despite its exceptionalism, the so called 
Yugoslav road to socialism represents the same type of undemocratic deformation.93 
 
2.2 (2) Land and Liberty 
  
One of the main features of the early phase of Mexican Revolution was a lack of 
organizational and ideological coherence in different parts of the country. A number 
of rival armies, consisting of poor peasantry and the workers were led by merchants 
and industrialists, whose economic and political advancement has been thwarted by 
the Diaz dictatorship. They fought for dominance within the movement against the 
organized peasant armies in the South. The goal of the movement was envisioned in 
different terms depending on the social layer participating in it. Northern middle and 
upper class liberals called for political reforms, the peasant farmers in the south 
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demanded radical land re-distribution, while the urban proletariat fought for more 
control over the process of production inside the factories.94  
 
Without a unified leadership, the overthrow of the Diaz dictatorship served as an 
interlude into fractional bickering between rival armies while the revolutionary 
dynamic was oscillating back and forth, from highly radical to more conservative 
periods. Mobilization of the popular masses, demanding radical discontinuity in the 
socio-economic conditions, prevented the landowners and industrialists, whose goals 
were limited to the realm of political and constitutional changes, from stabilizing their 
rule and renewing the state. This pressure form below was reflected in the drafting of 
the 1917 Constitution  widely considered as one of the most progressive in the world 
in its time, especially in the parts dealing with the separation of the church and the 
state, nationalization of natural resources and agrarian and work legislations.95 In its 
struggle against the radical agrarian movement, the revolutionary elite was forced to 
forge an alliance with the workers in the cities by giving out concessions to them. The 
stage was set for the birth of, what would later often be referred to as, the Mexican 
corporatist state  a situation where the state bureaucracy, seemingly standing above 
class conflict, serves as the sole guarantor of reconciliation and arbitration between 
various social interests.96  
 
With the defeat of the rural movements and consequent suppression of the working 
class, it was not until the 1930’s and new mobilizations from below that some of the 
basic revolutionary demands were pushed through when the radical wing of the 
bureaucracy and the masses found expression in the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas 
(1934–1940). Distribution of the land, a demand that stood at the heart of the 
Revolution, was finally enforced by Cárdenas in 1934. The communal right on the 
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land from the colonial times was brought back in the shape ejidos, where the state 
handed land over to the poor peasants who had an unalienable right to work these 
lands and even pass it on to their children. Working class gained exceptional union 
rights and wage increases. The economic role of the state was boosted in order to 
create a sovereign capitalism beneficial to the nation as a whole. Cárdenas 
nationalized the oil industry and put the railways under the control of workers’ 
administration. It was under his presidency that the Mexican state finally stabilized 
itself and the revolution became effectively institutionalized through a one party 
system that would prove to be amazingly stable in the following decades.97 
 
Political power was based on a number of clientele networks directed towards a 
single, dominant political party, which ruled through manipulation of revolutionary 
symbolism, plebiscitary legitimation and mechanism of co-optation. The Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI)98 was formed as a hegemonic block that incorporated 
interests of various social layers organized into separate mass organizations. A 
dominant labor union confederation, Confederación de Trabajadores de México 
(CTM), organizing majority of the workers, became one of the main pillars of 
stability for the new regime. Apart from the CTM, the peasants and ejidatarios were 
organized and attached to the party through the Confederación Nacional Campesina 
(CNC) while the so-called popular sector (CNOP) incorporated many skilled workers, 
professionals and business.99 All of them were connected to the party and stood in a 
client-patron relationship to the highly centralized state and the powerful institution of 
presidency. Existence of antagonistic social classes was thus openly recognized and 
incorporated into the state as a seemingly independent conciliatory body.100 
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2.3. Beginning of an End 
 
Economically, 1968 is generally seen as the peak of the state-led development era in 
both countries. Mexico, developing through the ISI101 coupled with strong corporatist 
features in the political sphere and Yugoslavia, with its one party political system and 
command socialist economy102 combined with market influences, began exhibiting 
similar features as they became more integrated into the world market. 
 
By the mid 1960’s, general optimism and faith in the ability of the revolutionary 
leaderships to take the emancipation project further began to fade. Parades of mass 
support for the government on national holidays and political turning points were still 
filling the city squares. Still, by now, these were not signs of spontaneous popular 
mobilizations but well rehearsed legitimizing showcases organized top to bottom.  
Former enemies of the Revolution now seemed to be its closest allies. The picture of 
Tito as a fierce partisan guerrilla leader now got replaced by the image of elderly 
statesman shaking hands with heads of states and royalty in his flamboyant 
uniforms.103 In Mexico, the years when Lázaro Cárdenas used to tour the countryside 
without bodyguards seemed like far away history. New presidents were now usually 
seen opening luxury hotels and playing golf with the business elites.104  
  
Political stability and economic growth were the highest value of both regimes. Social 
peace was achieved through co-optation while repression was usually the very last 
resort. System’s integrity however, depended mainly on their ability to continue 
distributing material rewards and integrating dissatisfaction by balancing between 
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different social groups constituting the party pillars. State driven capitalism and 
centrally planed socialist economy were approaching their limits of growth and once 
seemingly monolithic ruling bureaucracy started to show open signs of internal strife. 
The economic growth, now achieved through an increasing role of the market, made it 
extremely difficult to unite different parts of society developing with different 
dynamics and opposing interests. Disparity between the revolutionary ideals and 
pragmatic practice became too obvious. The student population found itself in the 
middle of changing times and felt the responsibility to summarize and express these 
general concerns in a political program. 
 
 
2.3 (1) Laissez-Faire Socialism105 
 
After breaking relations with the Soviet Union in 1948 and the early economic 
breakthrough, based partly on the post war enthusiasm of the population, the 
Yugoslav state soon felt all the shortcomings of bureaucratically planed economy. 
National Income, which had grown by 23 percent in 1948, rose by only 9 percent in 
1949 and then declined in each of the following three years.106 Post revolutionary 
“heroic communism”107 could only take society that far and now, it was argued, 
material incentives, including profit, should be introduced as drivers of growth.108 As 
an answer, a new economic system was introduced which would decentralize decision 
making process by giving more power to direct producers and their enterprises. The 
system of worker’s self management combined de jure worker’s control and indirect 
state planning along with increasing autonomy of the companies and introduction of 
market incentives.  
 
In order to prevent the collision of economic and political system, institutional reform 
soon followed. Transformation of bureaucratically planned society towards a self-
managing one was perceived as the dismantling of centralized federal political 
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structure. Democratization was seen primarily as decentralization, thus creating an 
array of local centers of power based on the national key. This process has led 
Rusinow to conclude that the Yugoslav political system had mutated from a 
“centralized Party oligarchy into a kind of multi-storied polyarchy of particular and 
institutionalized regional and functional interests”.109 Now there were four rival 
centers, each backed up by shifting coalitions of social groups and ideologies, filling 
in the vacuum left after de-Stalinization. The federal state apparatus in Belgrade, 
republican and provincial parties, managerial elite, coming out of the autonomous 
enterprises, and the theoretically ruling class; the self managing workers.110  
 
The fundamental assumption of this model was that scattered self-managed 
collectives would, somehow naturally, harmonize their particular interests through 
market openings and indirect influence of conscious Marxist workers within the 
workers councils.111 By the late 1960’s, it became obvious the model was producing 
many unwanted outcomes: lack of strategy of development for the economy as a 
whole, outbreak of localizing and technocratic tendencies, rising inequality, 
duplicated production capacities, unemployment, growing deficit of foreign trade, 
differing technologies etc. Tito’s Yugoslavia started to exhibit some of the worst 
characteristics of systems on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It combined bureaucratic 
mismanagement and resource wastage with growing social polarization and 
dominance of narrow interests over the general well-being.  
 
A good illustration of these tendencies is given by Pervan on the example of the 
system of higher education. He points out that university expansion was often 
irrational and arbitrary with considerable fragmentation, lack of co-ordination and 
wasteful duplication. There was no relation between university enrollment and the 
society’s future manpower needs. University departments were scattered on different 
sites throughout the city and each provided its students with all the subjects needed 
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for a particular degree with little cooperation between them. University of Zagreb, for 
example, had 12 separate mathematics departments in 1971.112  
 
Autonomous, self-managed enterprise, which was supposed to empower the working 
class, served as a launching pod for a new technocratic layer of managers pushing for 
more liberalization. Aligned with the growing middle class and small entrepreneurs in 
the countryside, this layer found its expression in the so called liberal wing of the 
ruling party standing in opposition to the old partisan political cadres.113 Between the 
early 1950’s and late 1960’s, a series of economic reforms ensued, which shaped the 
system referred to as “socialist commodity production”114. Yugoslavia became 
entangled in a series of rhetorical and practical paradoxes. 
 
The economic growth of the public sector fell from 9.6 percent between 1954 and 
1965 to 6 percent in the second half of 1960’s.115 Simultaneously, the private sector 
was on the rise. The government gave up on collectivization of the countryside 
already in 1953. In 1965 and 1966 some 12,000 new small workshops were opened in 
Serbia. In Croatia, 17,000 private truckers accounted for four fifths of the goods 
carried on the republic’s roads.116 Although 75 percent of investments were still 
coming from the state and the self managing sector in 1972 , private sector was up 
and coming with a quarter of total investments in the country.117 In 1967, legislation 
was passed which allowed foreign firms to enter into partnerships with domestic 
enterprises and repatriate their profits.118 Banks were starting to replace the state and 
its monopoly over investment policy. They could now be formed jointly by 
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enterprises and extend credits, often engaging in lending relationships with related 
industries in more underdeveloped republics.119 
 
One of the major grievances of the liberal faction was what they called the fiscal 
seizure of accumulation, meaning a strong re-distributional role performed by the 
federal state in its dealings with the republics. They were referring to the subsidies, 
which after being taxed away from the more successful companies and regions, were 
redistributed to unprofitable factories and less developed regions In this drive for 
economic authority, the local bureaucracies often played with nationalist sentiments 
to rally popular support and use it as a pressure tool in negotiations with the central 
authorities.120  
 
Results of the economic reform were widely perceived as a failure by the end of the 
1960’s. The average yearly growth at the height of the reforms, between 1964 and 
1967, amounted to 2.9 percent compared to almost 10 percent between 1961 and 1964 
and 12.7 percent between 1957 and 1960.121 The employment rate decreased form 5.9 
percent between 1954 and 1965 to only 1 percent in the second half of the 1960’s. In 
1965, the unemployment rate stood at 8, 8 percent or some 326.800 people 
unemployed in total despite the encouragement of massive immigration policy 
towards Western Europe.122 At the early years of planned economy, wage differentials 
were kept in ratio of 1:3.5. In 1967, they reached the scope of 1:20 inside Serbia. 
Rising social inequality was also expressed in the fact that an average worker had 2.5 
m² of housing space per family member while directors and highly qualified 
personnel at the same time had 35 m².123  
 
The working class was carrying the brunt of the reforms on its back and yet the space 
for its political expression was shrinking. The rise of middle layers and technocracy 
erased whole social groupings from political representation inside the Communist 
Party. Once dominating the Party ranks, peasantry was now down to 7.4 percent of 
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the membership. Between 1946 and 1967, the number of workers inside the Party has 
risen for 392 percent while at the same period that of administrators for 1.460 percent. 
In 1966, around half of the party membership consisted of people employed in the 
administration while 33.9 percent were workers. The number of youth members 
declined as well from 40 percent in 1950 to 12.6 percent in 1965.124 
 
The working class interpreted the formal move towards decentralization of economic 
decisions and more self-management literally, as an increase in their power in 
comparison with the former times.125 Nevertheless, rising competition between the 
companies and integration into the world market had for a consequence an 
atomization of self-management to the firm level and an increase in the power of the 
managers.126 The first national congress of the self-management workers’ councils, 
held in 1957, also proved to be the last one, leaving the self-management idea limited 
to the factory circle.127 Considered a taboo until the late 1950’s, labor strikes 
intensified and rose up to around 2,000 between 1960 and 1969.128  
 
Initially, the unions supported the greater autonomy of the production units; a demand 
identified with the liberal fraction. However, as Popov points out, the first signs of 
attempts to formulate an independent political program came during the 6th Congress 
of the Yugoslav Federation of Trade Unions when worker representatives openly 
raised their voices against the overblown bureaucratic layers at the federal and 
republic levels, demanded confiscation of the property acquired by corruption and 
illegal means and stressed on the necessity for the working class unity across 
Yugoslavia. Similar initiatives were raised in the republican congress of the Croatian 
League of Communists that same year with the workers insisting that the majority of 
places in the party organs should be reserved for blue-collar workers.129  
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At the same time, a split with Stalinism and general liberalization of political climate 
opened the space for a new generation of critical thinkers within academia which 
based its views on the humanist Marxist thought130 and established contacts with the 
New Left thinkers in the West. The search for theoretical justification of a break with 
Moscow in the early 1950’s opened the door for critical re-interpretations of Marxism 
and developed rapidly, from superficial criticisms of personality cult towards more 
complex search for the reasons of revolutionary deformation in the Soviet Union and 
socialist countries in general.  
 
For these scholars, the official call for more self-management stood in contradiction 
with the growing role of the market and bureaucratization. 1964 marks the launching 
of the Praxis magazine and the first summer school on the island of Korčula, both of 
which became the focus points for critically inclined left-wing Yugoslav scholars,. 
Praxis organized Korčula Summer School brought the leading Marxist intellectuals of 
the time to the country and initiated translations of their works.131 Positions held by 
Praxis contributors, as assistants and professors at the universities of Belgrade, 
Zagreb and Sarajevo brought these scholars into close contact with the student 
population. 
 
Praxis was just the best known example of the burgeoning intellectual activity among 
the students and intelligentsia inside Yugoslavia in the 1960’s.132 New tendencies in 
the filmmaking, popular music, theoretical magazines, youth journals and open 
forums in the universities challenged the ideological monopoly of the ruling party. In 
December 1966, the first public protest against the war in Vietnam was organized in 
Belgrade. This event also launched the first clashes of students with the police. By 
that time, a nucleus of critical students was already created at the University of 
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Belgrade ready to openly question Yugoslavia’s role in the world system and 
domestic reforms.133   
 
 
2.3 (2) Revolution Betrayed  
 
Balance of forces within the PRI started to change dramatically after the World War 
II. Through increased co-optation, labor and peasantry lost their positions, enjoyed 
under Cárdenas, of relatively autonomous state partners whose loyalty had to be won 
through concessions and political influence.134 While the working class was beginning 
to find itself in an increasingly submissive relationship to the patron party, the 
increasing weight of domestic and foreign monopolistic capital, outside of the 
traditional state sector, signaled the rising autonomy of the entrepreneurial class and 
its channels of dealing with the state bureaucracy.135  
 
Call for social equality gave way to ideas of trickle down economics  according to 
which the wealth accumulated by the private sector champions will eventually reach 
the masses. After appropriating the U.S. Cold War rhetoric towards communism and 
purging the left wing of the Cárdenas years, the PRI opened political space for a 
changing role of the state in the economic life. The public share of total investment 
fell from the high levels of almost 50 percent between 1940 and 1952 to 31.7 percent 
during the remainder of the 1950’s. Nevertheless, the State retained its function as the 
most important collective entrepreneur, but its task was now reversed and confined 
primarily to supporting private sector and preventing bottlenecks by investing in 
infrastructure with long economic pay off and benefits for what Ramirez calls the 
“free drivers”.136  
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Government was contributing to private accumulation by subsidizing fuel, electricity 
and transportation services below the prices created on the free market. On the other 
hand, the collectivized ejido agricultural sector was subsidizing basic foodstuffs, 
therefore enabling the urban population to access to these goods, while at the same 
time, maintaining the working class wages levels low, from the standpoint of the 
entrepreneurs. This policy has lead the state sector to operate at a constant deficit and 
made it harder for it to invest and expand.137 Cautious not to interrupt the private 
capital accumulation by an increase in corporate taxes and fearing inflation at the 
same time, the government turned to private deposit banks as the only alternative for 
financing public deficits. Between 1950 and 1970 the share of credits provided by 
these intermediaries increased in total financing of the state budget from 15.8 percent 
in 1955 to 42.4 percent in 1970. Apart from domestic investors, a liberalization of 
monetary policy also attracted considerable inflows of foreign financial capital.138 
 
It was not only the financial sector that pushed for integration into the world market. 
Ironically, the very protectionist policies, which originally helped put domestic 
industry on its feet, were now causing import dependency. Increasing complexity of 
Mexican capitalism required import of hi-tech capital goods.139 Between 1950 and 
1966, U.S. direct investment in Mexico grew from $286 million to almost $1.2 
billion.140 The ISI strategy was running out of steam as the unequal distribution of 
wealth within society limited internal demand for durable goods. On the other hand, 
overpriced domestic production had caused the Mexican products to be uncompetitive 
on the world market.141 The only successful enterprises seemed to be the ones that 
managed to swim around the protectionist barriers and find a foreign partner. 
 
This growing influence of finance capital and big enterprises connected with foreign 
multinationals was bound to cause dissatisfaction among smaller capitalists and 
artisans who depended on the state and traditionally formed the backbone of support 
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for the PRI. The 1965 Industrial Census recorded that in Mexico there were 2,100 
large industrial plants, employing more than 100 people, attracting more than 75 
percent of investment in the branch and producing 70 percent of the output value. On 
the opposite side stood 133,600 small establishments, with less than 100 employees, 
attracting 25.3 percent of total investment and producing 30 percent of industrial 
products.142 This duality expressed itself on top with mounting enmity between the so 
called políticos and técnicos inside the ruling party.143 
 
Factionalism on top was matched by rising polarization within society. The Gini 
coefficient had risen from 0.55 to 0.58 between 1963 and 1969.144 Favoring private 
accumulation as a tool of growth meant keeping wages low. Despite the rising 
productivity, real wages in the industry grew at extraordinary modest pace of 1 
percent annually from 1939 to 1975. Until the late 1960’s the real wages for industrial 
workers still remained lower than in Cárdenas years even as the worker productivity 
nearly doubled in the same period.145 Suppression inside the trade unions combined 
with the abandonment of land distribution and shifting agrarian policy towards large 
scale private farming provoked challenges from below to the corporate model. 
 
Workers and peasants started to fight the co-opted and corrupt leaderships in their 
organizations while many decided to abandon the official structures and founded rival 
confederations. It is estimated that by the end of 1950’s nearly one third of the 
workforce was organized in what can be termed as independent trade unions.146 The 
working class offensive has been cut off brutally with suppression of a railway strike 
in 1958 and now it was only a question of time before it jumped back into the political 
arena. In the meantime, the growing middle class has expanded its share in the 
appropriation of national income but, it was increasingly frustrated for being unable to 
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turn this economic strength into political influence. It was becoming more 
cosmopolitan in its outlook and along with the intelligentsia it strived for political 
liberalization inside the stifling one party system.147 
 
Crucial event in this process took place in the winter of 1958 when the railway 
workers national strike successfully resisted the government pressure for months, 
earning the reputation of the most important proletarian social movements in Mexico 
since the 1930’s.148 Initial demand for wage increases soon turned into a movement 
for general democratization of PRI controlled CTM unions, attracting other dissident 
unionists and acts of solidarity from different industrial sectors. The movement was 
eventually crushed by force with the army occupying the railways and thousands of 
unionists arrested.149 
 
Finally, the events outside of Mexico also contributed to the changing collective 
consciousness. Victory of the Cuban Revolution caused a remarkable echo all over 
Latin America. More than anywhere else, it was in Mexico, a country in which the 
discourse of revolution was regarded so highly, where Cuba sparked the hope of 
revival in popular politics. The Cuban example broke the ideological monopoly of the 
old left which, according to the theory of stages promoted by Moscow since the 
1930’s, held that there is no alternative but to deepen the capitalist transformation of 
Mexican society by supporting the progressive wing of the bourgeoisie.150 In practice, 
this meant pushing the PRI as far as possible to the left and waiting for capitalism to 
create necessary preconditions for the proletarian revolution.151  
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In the 1960’s, the revitalization of the revolutionary project seemed to be on the 
agenda, with or without the PRI. The University campuses in Mexico City became 
hotbeds of left wing student politics with a myriad of active groups influenced by 
Maoism, Trotskyism and the guerilla enthusiasm of the Cuban Revolution.152 Soon, 
there was a crystallization of demands for revitalization of the revolution pushed 
through in the public consciousness. These included: agrarian reform, autonomy of 
trade unions and peasant collectives, Mexican control over natural resources, 
nationalization of certain industries, just division of wealth, freeing of political 
prisoners, solidarity with Cuba and opposition to U.S. imperialism.153 
 
Carr also notes the emergence of a new generation of writers such as Carlos Fuentes 
and a series of journals, comic books, alternative coffee houses, salons and bookstores 
in Mexico city during the 1960’s, all of which contributed to the rise in critical 
consciousness. This new wave of political thought and cultural production 
demystified the ruling structures and official interpretations of the Mexican history. 
At the same time, the rural intelligentsia started to organize Cuban influenced guerilla 
movements in the countryside, triggering brutal government interventions.154 
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Chapter 3: 1968 
 
 
3.1. The Rise and Fall of the Movements  
 
Until the summer of 1968, both Mexico and Yugoslavia gave impression of self-
confident, stable political systems capable of dealing with instances of dissent behind 
closed doors, far away from the eyes of its citizens and the international media. Two 
seemingly trivial incidents sparked off a chain of events that exposed the vulnerability 
of both regimes. In Belgrade, the movement lasted for seven days and rarely got the 
chance to step out of the walls of the university buildings. Nevertheless, its sharp 
political analysis and orientation towards the working class scared the ruling circles 
and revealed their manipulative ways. In Mexico City, the political unrest went on for 
more than two months, within which, three distinct phases will be recognized. The 
movement won over hundreds of thousands of ordinary Mexicans who joined the 
students in protest marches through the Capital. It ended with one of the greatest 
tragedies in the history of the country with hundreds of students massacred by the 
Mexican army.  
 
3.1 (1) 1968 in Belgrade 
 
On Sunday evening, 2 June, a group of students from the Student City155 in New 
Belgrade attempted to enter a musical show organized in the honor of a volunteer 
youth brigade stationed in the area.156 After a prolonged scuffle between the students 
and security at the entrance gate, the militsiya157 used batons and water cannon to 
disperse the crowd. A rumor spread that one of the students was killed. Some 3,000 
enraged Student City residents gathered on the square outside the dormitories,  pushed 
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the militsiya forces back, overtook the water cannon, and spontaneously decided to 
march downtown to the Federal Parliament, chanting slogans: ‘Work Places for All!’, 
‘Workers-Students!’, and ‘Tito-Party!’158 At the nearby juncture, the students were 
intercepted by a stronger militsiya squad forcing them to retreat to the dormitories. 
Once back inside, the aroused population of the Student City agreed to organize an 
assembly the next day and march downtown to express their grievances in front of the 
government buildings. The first Action Committee of the demonstration was elected, 
whereas the Student Federation members were not allowed to candidate, as they were 
accused of sabotaging the student radio inside the dormitories that night.159  
 
The next morning, a marching column took off from New Belgrade towards the city 
center. This time, the number of protesters was higher and they were better organized. 
Party and national flags were carried in the front, as well as banners such as: ‘We are 
the sons of the workers!’, ‘Freedom of press and demonstrations!’ and ‘Down with 
the red bourgeoisie!’ A few hours earlier in the city center, the university Student 
Federation functionaries met with deans of all the faculties and the University League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) members. Together, these official University 
organizations condemned the militsiya violence and declared solidarity with the 
protesting students. The protest march was therefore joined by professors and 
university functionaries whose motivation, according to Marković, was “partly to 
express their solidarity and partly to channel the flow of events in order for things not 
to run out of control”.160 Halfway towards the center, the marching students were met 
by a blockade of thousands of militsiyamen gathered from all over Serbia.161 A group 
of high ranking Communist Party officials, headed by Veljko Vlahović (1914-
1975)162, also appeared on the scene with the aim to address the crowd and convince 
them to cancel their march and send a delegation instead. However, the students were 
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determined to continue their protest and reach downtown.163 In the middle of 
negotiations with the Party officials, the militsiya suddenly charged with batons and 
tear gas. The crowd dispersed chaotically, running back in direction of the 
dormitories.164 In the clashes that morning and the night before, one hundred and 
sixty-nine people had been injured altogether, twelve of which were hospitalized.165  
 
Back in the Student City, the demonstration Action Committee together with The 
Student magazine166 editorial board and representatives of the University Student 
Federation drafted the first official demand list. Initial demands of the Student City 
assembly consisted of: release of the students arrested the previous night, 
indemnification of the ones injured, ban on the breaching of the university autonomy 
and punishment for those responsible for attacks on the students.167 These demands 
were now expanded and summarized in the so called Proclamation (Proglas), which 
dealt with the recent incidents, and the Resolution (Rezolucija), which presented the 
more general views of students in protest on contemporary problems in the Yugoslav 
society. These two documents were then forwarded to faculties downtown, where 
students had gathered to discuss the New Belgrade incidents and adopted them 
collectively in assemblies.168 The assemblies also decided to occupy the faculties and 
elect their own Action Committees. The students attempted to turn the open space of 
the Student Square, in front of the Faculty of Philosophy, into the focal gathering 
point for all the students in strike. However, the militsiya pushed the gathered crowd 
inside the Philosophy Faculty campus, which from that point on turned into the 
central organizing place for the city wide student strike169  
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The assemblies (zborovi) were the basic organizational structure of the 1968 student 
movement in Belgrade. All students and employed staff of a respective faculty had the 
right to participate and to vote in the assembly. The assemblies elected the Action 
Committees as the main coordinating bodies and various other committees for 
political agitation, preparation of food, security etc. Mandates of all the Action 
Committee members were limited to 48 hours. Furthermore, they could be recalled at 
any moment if their actions went against the decisions of the Assembly.170 Another 
organizing form, unique to the Faculty of Philosophy, was the Convent (Konvent). 
This was an open discussion forum in which a speaker would engage in a free, 
question and answer, spontaneous communication with the crowd.171 Free from all 
formality and taboos, these sessions could go on for hours debating everything from 
philosophy and culture to current political themes.172 Action Committees from the 
various faculties never managed to form an independent coordinating body for the 
entire university. This role was taken over by the traditional structures such as the 
University Committees of the Student Federation and the University League of 
Communists which were opened up to include representatives of the protest Action 
Committee and The Student editorial board.173  It is estimated that around 60,000 
students participated in the strike during those seven days.174 
 
On 4 June, the Ministry of Interior formally banned all public demonstrations, thus 
limiting the protest to the occupied university buildings.175 The official media 
projected the picture of the student actions as acts of vandals, destroying public 
property.176 Student newspapers, on the other hand, rarely found their way out of the 
printing premises due to government censorship. Solidarity protests were organized 
by students in Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Sarajevo, nevertheless none of these evolved 
into a university strike of the scale seen in Belgrade. Isolated from all sides, the 
students focused their efforts on finding allies outside of the university walls. Strike 
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delegations attempted to reach the factories and establish contact with the workers and 
numerous appeals were made for Tito to visit the students and hold a public meeting 
with them.177  
 
The establishment responded by ordering the Party cells inside the factories to form 
workers’ guards at the gates in order to prevent the students from reaching the 
employees.178 Moreover, a smear campaign of the student actions was orchestrated by 
the government, in which the various self management councils, from all corners of 
Yugoslavia, sent public letters condemning the students “selfish impatience and 
destruction of social property”.179 The Communist League was divided over its tactics 
in confronting the student movement. The hardliners did not shy away from using the 
army as the means for dispersing the crowds from the university buildings. The 
others, expressed conditioned support and understanding for student demands, 
however strongly condemned the movement’s methods and urged them to re-orient 
their actions towards the institutional self-management channels.180  
 
Caught in the web of dismissals and reservations, the focus of student efforts switched 
from outward general critique of society to inward justification of the movement 
itself. In this situation, the traditional university organizations were able to impose 
themselves as transmitters between the students and the government. On their 
initiative, a new program was drafted, which toned down the minimal demands from 
the Proclamation, thus creating the preconditions for ending of the blockade and  
continuation of discussion of the longer term demands inside the official institutional 
framework.181 Once presented to the assemblies, this compromise draft was however 
attacked for being too mild and got rejected by all the main assemblies.182 By 9 June, 
the militsiya encircled the faculties and the media attacks started to heat up. The 
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Faculty of Arts was invaded with the students beaten up and arrested.183 The 
government started to send clear signals that it was considering the usage of armed 
forces.184 That same night, it was announced that President Tito would address the 
nation. Since the beginning of the student revolt, Tito had remained silent, letting 
different factions bicker over the appropriate response to the student movement. Now, 
both the Party and the student assemblies anxiously expected the verdict of the 
supreme arbiter.185  
 
At the surprise of many, Tito fully supported the student grievances in his speech. He 
assured the students that he would personally look after that the problems get solved 
and called upon the students to help him in this task. In addition, he also stated that if 
he proved to be incapable of engineering their demands, he should step down from the 
office.186 Upon hearing this confirmation of their efforts, the students broke out of 
their school buildings and paraded the streets in a victorious mood.187 The immediate 
result of Tito’s address was de-activation of the movement. The majority of the 
students understood that they had won and therefore there was no reason to continue 
with the strike. In front of 10,000 students gathered in the Student City, the head of 
the University Communist League characterized Tito’s “words of trust” as “our 
biggest victory”188. The Belgrade University rector stated that the students should now 
justify the trust given to them by comrade Tito and return to classes.189  
 
On 26 July, Tito spoke about the recent events in quite a different tone, warning about 
the infiltration by various hostile elements of the student movement with the aim of 
introducing the multi-party system and negating the working class as the most 
important factor in the society. He categorically stated that there was no place in the 
                                                 
183 D. Plamenić, The Belgrade Student Insurrection, New Left Review, 54, March-April 1969, 
p. 65 
184 Ivan Miladinović, 1968: Tajna i opomena, Draganić, Beograd, 2003, p. 136 
185 James Robertson, Discourses of democracy and exclusion in the streets of Belgrade , 1968 
– 1997, University of Sydney, Sydney, 2006, p. 24 
186 Dragan R. Marković, Demonstracije 1968. godine, in Univerzitet u Beogradu 1838-1988, 
Beogradski Univerzitet, Beograd 1988, p. 991 
187 James Robertson, Discourses of Democracy and Exclusion in the Streets of Belgrade , 
1968 – 1997, University of Sydney, Sydney,  2006, p. 25 
188 Mirko Arsić, Dragan R. Marković. ’68. Studentski bunt i društvo,  Beograd, 1984, p. 124 
189 Mirko Arsić, Dragan R. Marković. ’68. Studentski bunt i društvo,  Beograd, 1984, p. 123 
 51
university for “this type of people with these ideas”.190 The purges had started already 
six days earlier with the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Sociology 
Committees being expelled from the League of Communists. In September 1969, the 
Student Union of the Philosophy Faculty published an open letter pointing out to 
series of detentions, hearings and arrests taking place in the previous months against 
the students identified as the leaders of the 1968 strike movement.191 In 1972, three 
participants of the 1968 movement were put in court and convicted as a “Trotskyite 
group conspiring against the people and the state”.192 Finally, in 1975, eight 
professors connected with the Praxis group, were discharged from their positions in 
the Philosophy Faculty as “politically and morally unsuitable” teachers.193 
 
 
3.1 (2) 1968 in Mexico City 
 
Los granaderos was a name given to special anti-riot police formed by the Mexican 
government in order to suppress acts of dissidence. Mabry notes how they were 
infamous for their willingness to “obey commands without question”.194 Since the 
1940’s, these units were most often used as an instrument in crushing labor strikes.195 
On 23 July 1968 however, the granaderos were dispatched to handle a street fight 
between two groups of students from the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) and 
private preparatory schools in Mexico City. Clashes of youth gangs were a known 
occurrence in the Capital and this particular incident had no political background. 
Nevertheless, a sharp intervention from the granaderos awoke the anger of Poly 
students all over the city.196  
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The National Federation of Technical Students (FNET), a PRI affiliated student 
organization, attempted to co-opt the stirring inside the schools by channeling it into a 
peaceful protest march. On 26 July, some 30,000 students walked down the city 
center. Despite the fact that one part of the protesters expressed desire to present their 
grievances to the president the organizers explicitly avoided to lead the march towards 
the Zócalo square in front of the National Palace  a symbolic space reserved 
exclusively for Presidential addresses and government organized rallies.197 FNET 
demonstration took an unexpected turn however, when the marching column came 
across a smaller protest in solidarity with the Cuban Revolution198 organized by the 
rival left wing Center of Democratic Students (CNED) campus group. Part of the 
demonstrators decided to join forces and try to reach the nearby Zócalo square. They 
were intercepted by a tough police action.  
 
What ensued were violent street battles between the police and the students 
throughout the night. Students built barricades and took cover inside the IPN 
preparatory schools in the area.199 Occupied schools were utilized for holding a series 
of assemblies by the students to discuss their next moves. A decision was made for 
the barricades not to be lifted until all of their peers arrested in last night clashes were 
released from the police custody. The Economics Preparatory School assembly went 
even further, demanding abolition of the granaderos corps altogether and expulsion of 
government affiliated FNET organization from schools.200 In an effort to reestablish 
control over these institutions, the government invaded them, using force once again.   
 
By blowing up a historic wooden door of the preparatory school, associated with the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the police infuriated the public 
and pulled yet another major university into protest. Under the normal circumstances 
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it would have been unimaginable for these two schools to collaborate. In contrast to 
the IPN, which was located in the working class barrios and recruited students from 
skilled workers and emerging middle class families, UNAM was considered the most 
prestigious institution in the country with a long tradition of autonomy.201 This 
incident suddenly brought the two rival systems of higher learning together into a 
strike over a unified cause.202 Moreover, the university administration could not 
remain passive any longer. On August 1, in reaction to this violent breach of 
autonomy, the UNAM rector Javier Barros Sierra, lead a united march of more than 
fifty thousand students through the city.203 What only until the day before seemed like 
a scuffle between a group of adolescents and the police had now turned into a student 
strike with rising momentum. 
  
The forming of the National Strike Council (CNH), on 2 August, marks the beginning 
of the second phase for the movement. The one in which students built an 
organizational infrastructure capable of spreading the strike and mobilizing ever 
increasing numbers of people in the streets. During the first week of the movement, 
the so called Committees of Struggle (Comités de Lucha) emerged spontaneously as 
an organizational pattern, independent from all existing student bodies. Struggle 
Committees from each faculty on strike elected their representatives to the CNH as 
the main coordinating organ of the strike. Delegates were subject to recall at any time 
if they failed to account for their actions to the respective faculty assembly.204 
Representatives inside the CNH were rotated weekly. There was a conscious effort 
not to promote any identifiable student leadership or individuals which could be 
exposed to repression or co-optation by the government.205 As the strike spread, the 
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CNH grew to 150 delegates representing some 150,000 students from more than 
seventy secondary and preparatory schools206 as well as the university faculties.207  
 
While the CNH was responsible for coordinating and setting the general tactics line 
for the movement, on the other end of the organizational ladder, the so called student 
brigades were the ones doing most of the daily practical work on the ground. The 
brigades were groups of five to ten people organized in accordance with their skills. 
Students of law and medicine established legal counseling and medical clinics in the 
neighborhoods. Students also ran their own radio station.208 The central role was 
played by the political brigades who had the task of building bridges with other 
sectors of society by distributing leaflets, holding speeches and collecting donations 
for the strike.209 By the mid-August there were around 150 such brigades operating in 
all of the institutions on strike.210 
 
Throughout August, it seemed that students had taken over the initiative and forced 
the government into a defensive. President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (19641970) had 
offered his “extended hand”211 to the students after the initial, rector lead protest 
march. A week later, this gesture was made more concrete with an offer presented by 
the government, through the official university structures, suggesting the appointment 
of a joint commission, composed of students, government officials and others, that 
would investigate the charges and come up with solution proposals. The students 
declined this offer, suspecting it as a trap which would result in a commission being 
“bogged down in trivia and eventually disappearing without anything concrete being 
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done except to kill the movement”.212 Instead, the students insisted on open 
negotiations with the CNH, as the only legitimate body of the protest, in the presence 
of the media and the spectators.213 
 
The other side of government’s tactics consisted of efforts to discredit the students’ 
movement as an act of foreign provocateurs trying to destabilize the country.214 The 
CNH responded to these attacks two times in a row during August, by organizing 
massive rallies reaching up to 400,000 participants at the Zócalo square.215 These 
protests, taking place on 14 August and 27 August, mark the golden period of the 
movement. They showcased the power of students to rally the support of the citizens 
behind them, moving well beyond any mobilization the government could organize as 
a counterbalance.216 Backed by this public showcase of solidarity, the students set the 
tempo of events and appeared to be winning.  
 
Nevertheless, the Mexican government still held control over the main levers of 
power within the state.217 President Diaz Ordaz’s address to the nation on 1 
September, revealed the government is ready to “go as far as it has to”218 in order to 
restore order. This speech opened the way for final stage of the movement, in which 
the government abandoned further attempts at co-optation and focused on violent 
intimidation instead. The counterattack started with heightened media propaganda 
against the students, pressure on the official university organs and violent 
provocations on the ground.219 
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On 9 September, rector Javier Barros Sierra issued a call for a return to classes. 
Professor’s associations followed his lead.220 As a response to the created climate of 
hostility, the CNH decided to tone down its rhetoric and organized yet another mass 
rally of 200,000 people marching down the streets of the capital in complete silence 
with tape over their mouths.221 The movement kept calling for a dialogue, with one 
part, now even prepared to consider dropping the demand for a public exposure and 
conducting negotiations on paper instead.222 However, unlike one month before, now 
there was no hand extended from the president’s side.  
 
On 18 September, the army forces invaded the UNAM campus. CNH members were 
arrested in the streets. In the following days, armed porras223 attacked preparatory 
schools all over the city and beat up students. By September 23, the IPN campus was 
invaded as well, thus leaving the movement without its last organizing headquarters. 
The climax came on October 2, at the Plaza of the Three Cultures in Tlatelolco.  
A large student gathering was surrounded by the army which, at one point, began to 
shoot indiscriminately at the crowd. Around 5,000 soldiers fired fifteen thousand rifle 
rounds.224 The CNH activists who survived were arrested and executed the very same 
night or taken into custody. Officially, fifty-seven people were killed while 2,000 
were arrested. Until today, the exact number of victims is not known; Mabry 
estimated the body count to be close to three hundred225. The openings of the military, 
police and intelligence files in 2002, by the Vincente Fox government, however, 
indicate the number of casualties could be lower than previously assumed.226 
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The massacre de facto broke the movement that night. The strike officially ended on 
21 November, with none of the student demands being granted by the government.227 
 
 
3.2 Political Outlook and Demands 
 
Neither Mexican, nor Yugoslav students had illusions about their role as agents of 
change within society. They both looked to other social classes for guidance, although 
none of them managed to build firm alliances and spread the strike towards the 
working class or the peasantry. Both movements walked the thin line of supporting 
the historical processes started a few decades earlier but negating the current sclerotic 
structures in power, claiming to represent the continuation of this revolutionary 
legacy. Such an orientation allowed their message to have a powerful resonance in the 
popular consciousness, but at the same time, made it more open for government 
cooptation. In Belgrade, this role was played by the living embodiment of the 
Yugoslav Revolution, Josip Broz Tito, who used his prestige to single handedly 
separate the student mass from the activist nucleus and demobilize the movement. 
Mexico had no such charismatic figure on top. There, the students cut the umbilical 
cord with the system early on, by organizing a parallel organizational structure, thus 
challenging the PRI’s claim on political monopoly and placing themselves, perhaps 
unconsciously, outside of the negotiation arena.  
 
3.2 (1) Down with the ‘Red Bourgeoisie’ 
 
From the first day of strike, Belgrade students made careful distinction between their 
minimum-short term demands (Proglas) and the more general political orientation of 
the movement (Rezolucija). The list of minimum demands included: 
1. Immediate release from jail of all the arrested colleagues; 
2. Resignation of those functionaries responsible for ruthless behavior of the militsiya; 
3. Parliament convention in order to discuss the student issues with university and 
student representatives; 
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4. Resignation of the directors and editorial chiefs of Belgrade newspapers, radio and 
the press agency for having deliberately falsified the events of 2 June.228 
 
The Resolution on the other hand, stressed the following points as major weaknesses 
of the system they referred to as “our socialist society”229 and recommended certain 
steps for its improvement: 
 
1. The emergence of great social inequalities in the community. In connection with 
this, the students demanded: systematic application of the socialist principles of 
distribution according to work, energetic actions against the accumulation of private 
property in a non-socialist manner with immediate nationalization of improperly 
gained private property, abolition of all the privileges in the society etc. 
2. The rising unemployment. To this end, the students proposed: abolishment of 
honorary and overtime work, introduction of measures for employment of young 
qualified workers, introduction of a long range development concept for the economy 
based on the right of work for all people in the country etc. 
3. The existence of strong bureaucratic forces in the society. Measures required in 
combating these are: democratization of all socio-political organizations  especially 
the League of Communists, democratization of the media, freedom of assembly and 
demonstration. 
4. The worsening conditions inside the university. The students demanded: better 
material conditions on the faculties, the right of students to participate in all decision 
making processes important for the society in general and student issues in particular, 
democratic election of the entire teaching staff, free admission for all applicants etc.230 
 
The general direction of the political program of Belgrade 1968 movement is 
therefore clear. As Arsić and Marković point out, it favored conscious directing of 
economic reproduction in contrast to the market impulsiveness, democratic control 
over the organs of power and means of public communication as opposed to 
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bureaucratic voluntarism and manipulation, social equality based on socialist property 
and distribution in contrast to capital relation and self-management reorganization of 
the educational system in opposition to its dominant bourgeois character.231 In 
essence, this program sought to reform the old bureaucratic structure of the system 
and at the same time escape the reintroduction of the market as the only possible 
framework for this task.  
 
The accusations, coming from the top, about the movement being anti-working class 
and in favor of exchanging the self-management political structure with the multi-
party system could easily be discarded by looking at the strike slogans and 
documents. In open letters to the Yugoslav working class and president Tito, the 
students insisted on the fact that they have no particular interests apart from those of 
the working class. The workers were seen as the only social layer which carries 
universal interests of the society as a whole, in contrast to the bureaucracy which 
endangers the further development of socialism with its particularistic views.232 
Similarly, the students proclaimed that they have no program separate from that of the 
League of Communists and the Yugoslav Constitution. The problem in their eyes was 
not the system as a whole, but the bureaucratic layer standing in the way of what the 
students called “true socialism”.233 The government should therefore apply its own 
program in practice.234 Slogans on banners hung from the Faculties express this 
orientation in a precise manner: “The Revolution is still not finished!”, “We had 
enough of the red bourgeoisie!”, “Self-Management from bottom to the top!”, 
“Bureaucracy hands off workers!”, “Political work-Free work!”, “No to the 
restoration of capitalism!”, “Long live the unity of workers and the students-the 
precondition of true self-management!”, and others.235 
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The LCY observed the student strike as a serious threat. The movement faced the 
governing nomenklatura, for the first time, with political mobilization outside of the 
official social institutions and openly called upon the working class to join them by 
doing the same. The main task of the Party was therefore to prevent any ties with the 
workers and return the majority of the students into the framework of institutionalized 
self-management.  
 
The extent of fear inside the ruling circles from a French scenario, of workers-
students alliance, had been recognized by Tito in his speech, when he described the 
crisis had shocked many comrades in the Party and made them realize what could had 
happened if the working class was “less conscious and undertook steps not in 
harmony with relations in our socialist society”.236 Many researchers point out that, 
despite the government repression, contacts between students and the workers have 
been established in many instances.237 Nevertheless, the majority of the workers 
remained skeptical towards student actions or opted for passive support or apathy in 
the face of increased pressure inside the work places.238  
 
The second challenge for the government, namely reaffirming the validity of 
traditional institutions, was achieved gradually. As Robertson notes, during the 
student protest, two radically different discourses of self-management emerged. The 
official one, represented by the LCY and government backed institutions inside the 
University and the oppositional one, transmitted by the student activists and radical 
professors and expressed through the spontaneous Action Committees.239 
Organizationally, there was never a clear cut line between these two tendencies, as 
many of the student activists and radical professor were members of the Party 
structure inside the faculties and these organizations opened up to the Action 
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Committees early on, in order not to be left behind by the course of events.240 As the 
movement became more isolated, the official structures gained strength as the only 
channel of communication with the government. The crucial act which reintegrated 
students into the orbit of institutionalized self-management however was Tito’s 
historical address. 
 
For the majority of students, Tito never ceased to be the embodiment of the Yugoslav 
Revolution. Throughout the strike one of the slogans was “Tell Tito the truth!”241 
According to Pervan, the aim of his speech was to conciliate the mass of students and 
to isolate and discredit the more radical element among them.242 The focus of Tito’s 
speech was on the justification of student grievances. This recognition from the 
highest political authority proved to be a magnet which took the power away from the 
Action Committees. There seemed to be no further need for exhausting activism, 
since the students now had the most powerful figure in the country working on their 
side. At the same time, Tito clearly limited his support to “90 percent of the honest 
youth…not poisoned by various Đilas and Mao Zedong theories”243 Thus, he left a 
grain of suspicion upon which the government would later reconnect and repress the 
radicalized nucleus in silence once the movement had lost steam. 
 
3.2 (2) Fulfillment of the Revolutionary Program 
 
Starting as a student protest against police brutality, the strike of the Mexican students 
soon transformed itself into a broader social movement and took up more general 
political themes. Demands of the initial assemblies were limited to local grievances of 
Poly students, asking for immediate release of colleagues arrested in clashes with the 
police and firing of police officials responsible for the usage of force.244 By 2 August, 
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the CNH came up with six official demands of the movement, thus summarizing 
various demands from the schools in strike. The students called for: 
1. Liberation of political prisoners; 
2. Dismissal of police chiefs responsible for the usage of force against the students; 
3. Abolition of the granaderos corps and prohibition of the creation of similar corps; 
4. Abolition of Articles 145 and 145 of the Penal Code;245 
5. Indemnification of the families of the dead and injured who had been victims of 
aggression since 26 July; 
6. Clarification of the responsibility of officials for the acts of repression and 
vandalism committed by the police, granaderos and the army.246 
 
Demands one and four immediately catch the eye of any researcher of 1968 in 
Mexico, as they have little or no direct connection with what had happened to the 
students. Mabry points out that no student had been or would be arrested under the 
provisions of Article 145 and that these laws were commonly associated with the 
imprisonment of trade union leaders in 1958.247 Carr labels these particular demands 
as “long-standing obsession of leftist trade unions, peasant movements, and political 
parties”.248 Carey notes that demands one, three, and four had their legacy in the 
workers struggles of the fifties and quotes one of the CNH members describing the 
strike as a “student movement that did not really have student demands”.249 
 
In a political vacuum created by the corporatist Mexican state, the students became 
bearers of the demands put forward by the suppressed movements of peasants, 
workers and leftist opposition parties in the preceding decades. Moreover, the 
student’s tactic was to inspire these groups to join them and lead the movement. In a 
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document issued on 3 August, analyzing the meaning and perspectives of the 
movement, the Strike Committee of the Faculty of Philosophy and letters of the 
UNAM stated:  
 
“It is difficult, at this stage, to overcome the lack of a cohesive, revolutionary 
organization; it is nonetheless possible to lay down some tactical and strategic 
guidelines indicating form of action and goals…the student action, however 
important, is not socially definitive…future action will be determined, in the last 
analysis, by the position adopted by the working masses.”250 
 
On 12 September, the CNH drafted a political program to be presented to the workers 
and peasants as a common platform for what hey defined as the “nation-wide, long 
term, joint struggle”.251 Workers-related demands included: wage increases in 
accordance with the rise in the costs of living, fighting of unemployment by reduction 
in the hours of work, workers control to ensure a just distribution of profits, 
independent and democratic trade unions as well as formation of Comités de Lucha 
inside factories, connected on a federal level as the working class equivalent of the 
CNH. In the countryside, the students proposed the introduction of easy and low-
interest farm loans to small landholders and ejidos, elimination of the middle-men and 
forming of the peasant Comités de Lucha independent of government control.252 
 
The proposals stated above represent clear ideological continuity with the radical 
ideas present inside the Mexican Revolution which found expression inside the 
Constitution of 1917 and were put in practice shortly under the presidency of 
Cárdenas. According to students, the existence of granaderos corps and Article 145 
had to be canceled because they were unconstitutional. Arguments for the 
introduction of workers control inside the factories were also based on the Article of 
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the 1917 Revolutionary Constitution which entitles workers to profit-sharing.253 
Adler-Hellman notes that portraits of Emiliano Zapata, Pancho Villa, Benito Juarez 
and the imprisoned workers’ leader Demetrio Vallejo254 were carried in preference to 
those of Mao or Ho Chi Minh, as a symbolic call for the “fulfillment of Mexico’s own 
Revolution”.255 Similarly, Krauze mentions the marchers often sang the Mexican 
national anthem.256 This claim on the traditions of domestic revolutionary heritage 
proved to be a double edged sword for the movement. On the one hand, it helped to 
repudiate allegations of foreign influence and gain public support. At the same time, it 
also made the movement more prone to engage itself in paternalistic relationship with 
the PRI, a party that was still seen by many as the main bearer of the revolutionary 
tradition inside Mexico. 
 
Even though some dissident labor groups supported the students, the official labor 
sector of the PRI, still organizing majority of the workers in the country at that point, 
officially distanced itself and condemned the movement claiming that students have 
been manipulated “by subversive agents of the left and right in order to create an 
atmosphere of chaos”.257 Reaching rural workers was even harder given the urban 
character of the student movement and the political isolation of the rural people.258 
The Conquering of the Zócalo, with hundreds of thousands of protesters, two times in 
a row in August, showed that the population was responsive to the student cries. 
Nevertheless, judging from all the accounts, the nature of this support was passive. 
People would greet the students from the balconies, contribute food or pass covers to 
the protesters marching in rain. This support was never institutionalized. The calls by 
the left wing activists inside the movement for orienting the brigades towards the 
factory zones went unheeded by most of the students.259 Instead, the protest was 
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aiming at symbolic public spaces in the city center in order to win the sympathy of the 
broad public. The slogan unete pueblo (People unite), heard from thousands of throats 
during the protest marches, therefore remained an abstract call. The mobilization of 
the masses was conducted not with the intention of building concrete alliances, but 
putting up the pressure on the government to engage into negotiations. 
 
Regardless of the hostile tone exhibited towards the President, the students effectively 
recognized his authority and demanded government’s attention. Until the night of the 
massacre at Tlateloloco, the students hoped to hold a dialogue with the president, but 
they also feared co-optation and exploitation.260 Conscious of the traps the previous 
movements have fallen into and encouraged by the success of their own strike, the 
students insisted on the transparency of negotiations with the government. This 
stubborn demand form their side went against the very nature of the system used to 
strike deals behind closed doors. Krauze quotes one of the participants, saying that if 
the president had made a gesture on 27 August, despite the insults, and addressed the 
masses gathered in the Zócalo, “he would have won over many of the comrades”.261 
At this point however, it was already too late. The movement had exhibited amazing 
potential for mobilization outside of the official channels and therefore stepped out of 
the cooptation arena.  
 
For the government, it was of crucial importance to maintain its image as the defender 
of the values of the Mexican Revolution.262 Because of this, it was necessary to start 
asserting immediately that the strike was a deed of foreign agitators wanting to 
embarrass Mexico in front of the approaching Olympic Games.263 Simultaneously, the 
president made hints that he is ready to negotiate.264 The co-optation machinery was 
put in motion through FNET and university personal close to PRI, trying to insert 
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itself at the front lines of the protest.265 It was expected that the dialogue would take 
place in secrecy within the official PRI channels. By mid August, it became clear that 
the movement spilled out of the boundaries of typical student protest against school 
fees or police brutality. The ostracizing of FNET, the forming of independent CNH, 
mobilizations in the streets and connections with other layers within society scared the 
establishment. The PRI started to consider physical suppression of the movement as 
the last option at hand while the students kept clinging for negotiations. Few hours 
before the Massacre on 2 October, the CNH representatives met with government 
officials in hope of some kind of breakthrough in talks.266 Obviously, the government 
had already reached a decision to end the strike by any means necessary. 
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Chapter 4: Legacies of 1968 
 
 
4.1. Dismantling of Revolutions 
 
The year 1982 symbolizes yet another turning point in the history of Yugoslavia and 
Mexico. The pressure of altered international environment and rising contradictions of 
internal social and economic factors contributed to a halt in the further development 
of Yugoslav socially planned economy and self-management as well as the Mexican 
Import Substitution Industrialization and the corresponding corporatist state structure. 
The free flow of petrodollars throughout the 1970’s enabled the developing countries 
to survive the 1973 oil crisis and the ensuing recession in the Western markets. 
However, the sudden increase in the interest rates on U.S. dollars, in 1979, pushed the 
developing world into a debt crisis and economic depression.267 
 
In 1982, the “Mexican Crisis” became a paradigm for this weakened position of 
developing countries as Mexico officially announced it was no longer being able to 
meet debt obligations.268 That same year, political changes inside the Yugoslav 
Communist Party, after Tito’s death in 1980, cleared the way for the government to 
apply for a three-year standby loan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 
face of depleting foreign reserves, failing exports and mounting foreign debt.269 Both 
countries practically gave up a part of their economic sovereignty by agreeing to the 
IMF conditions for renegotiation of the debt. Outside demands for economic reforms 
strengthened forces which, within both societies, had been pushing the economy in 
the direction of liberalization since the 1960’s.270 The weight of the reforms was put 
on the social classes considered to be the building blocks and main beneficiaries of 
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the post-revolutionary societies. The complex state structures, nurtured for decades, 
now stood in the way of full integration into the world market.  
 
The year 1982 thus marked the end of the path of evolutionary changes the Yugoslav 
and Mexican society had undertook since the Revolutions, and opened the doors of 
transition towards a qualitatively different models of development. The end costs of 
this transformation in the Yugoslav case, I will argue among many others, proved to 
be the break-up of the country and the series of bloody civil wars in the 1990’s. 
Despite the high social costs and instances of civil unrest,271 Mexico had gone through 
its transition phase peacefully and the regime managed to maintain continuity through 
reform, culminating in the first loss of presidential election by the PRI in 2000.272  
 
4.1 (1) Prelude to a War 
 
Recognizing the student revolt of 1968 as an early sign of things to come, if nothing 
was changed, the top of the Yugoslav Party pyramid set out a new course in the 
1970’s. Once the left opposition was dealt with, the beginning of the decade was 
marked by purges of the “nationalists” and “liberals” in the Party structures and the 
reinvention of self-management in practice.273 As a response to self-serving 
monopolistic and technocratic forms coming out of the market reforms in the 1960’s, 
a new left rhetoric was launched predicting a conservative backlash. However, the 
system did not swing back to increased centralist control. Quite the opposite, the new 
Constitution, implemented in 1974, attempted to fight the released centrifugal forces 
and weaken local interests by further decentralization on the micro level. All 
enterprises were broken down into the smaller self-managed units as the central legal 
entity of the economic system.274 The idea was that these smaller units would be 
forced to cooperate to survive thus promoting national stability. In practice, this 
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reform only re-arranged the stage for a new wave of tendencies already seen in the 
1960’s. Competitiveness between companies and particularistic view of self-
management operating in the market frame resurfaced again, this time around.275  
 
The atomization of investment decision to the level of republics, provinces, 
companies and independent units within the companies, coupled with the opening up 
toward the international market, lead to an unconstrained borrowing spree and 
duplicated or mistaken investment projects.276 Dependence on imports for industrial 
branches, low competitiveness in the international arena and difficulties in export, 
thanks to global recession, all lead to a deteriorating balance of payment and net 
foreign debt which reached more then $17 billion by the end of 1980.277 The servicing 
of foreign debt took a huge toll on the Yugoslav economy and its social system in the 
following decade. The IMF inspired austerity measures, which, according to Lydall, 
Yugoslavia pursued with “relentless determination”278 put a freeze on new 
investments in social services, infrastructure and government projects.  
 
Annual percentage change in gross fixed investments was growing steadily from 1974 
to 1979 at the rate of 8.8 percent, only to gain a negative trend of - 7.5 percent 
between 1979 and 1985 with social services picking up the un-proportional part of 
investment cuts.279 In the same period, the Real Social Product decreased by the 
annual average rate of 0.9 percent. The government sought every possible way to 
limit domestic consumption and cut the costs of exports. The real net personal income 
for a worker employed in productive state sector rose at an average rate of 6.8 percent 
per annum in 1960’s, 2.1 percent in 1970’s and fell at the annual rate of - 4.7 percent 
between 1979 and 1985.280 Unemployment reached 14 percent nationwide in 1984 
while in the more underdeveloped regions it went up as high as 27 percent. The living 
standard of working class families was pushed back to the level of early 1960’s.281  
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Discussing the future of Yugoslavia in 1976, Denitch, pointed out to industrial 
working class as the vital layer for stability of the country as it was “uprooted from its 
traditional particularist background and therefore least responsive to separatist ethnic 
nationalism and least likely to be hostile to the institutions of self-management or to 
social system as a whole”.282 Yet, as Flaherty notes, the 1974 reforms slowed down 
the process of internal migration between republics and forming of a unified Yugoslav 
working class. Once given the autonomy over investments policy, the imperative of 
profit for enterprises built barriers of entry for the new workforce by firms focusing 
on capital intensive growth instead.283  By the mid 1980’s, Woodward describes the 
emergence of a new underclass of unemployed, unskilled workers and youth in the 
urban centers. Among those still holding their workplaces, a tendency towards 
absenteeism, in order to work on second jobs, was recorded as well as the rising 
significance of the black market in the everyday life.284 Decline in the purchasing 
power and swelling unemployment caused the resurfacing of social characteristics 
thought to be left behind after the revolution, or considered to be reserved for rural 
areas, such as: ritual kinships, old stereotypes, ethnic bias, religious revival etc.285 The 
urban industrial working class, as the social bedrock of the self-management system, 
was disintegrating fast under the changed circumstances. 
 
On the other hand, there was a part of the bureaucracy within various republics and 
federal government which welcomed the coming changes. The reforms shifted the 
economic policy in favor of those firms, sectors and areas that already had links and 
experience in doing business with the Western markets and access to hard currency.286 
Liberal faction within the Party was divided by regional interests however and it was 
growingly hard to distinguish it from the nationalist opposition. In order to implement 
the prescribed reforms effectively, the authority of the federal government had to be 
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reinforced. This move was viciously opposed by republican elites which blamed the 
inefficient economic allocation and political choices of the central government for 
bringing the economy to collapse in the first place. In the words of Woodward, those 
whose views might seem more liberal and Western were in fact the most 
nationalistic.287  
 
Everyone in the political machinery now however agreed that if the reform was to be 
successful, the country needed to dismantle the complex networks of negotiated 
redistributions in the economy and the set of political institutions that administered 
them, such as: workers councils, the army and various party affiliated umbrella 
organizations of workers and youth. With no cohesive force holding the country 
together, apart from the synchronized austerity plan of the federal bureaucracy, the 
Yugoslav Communist Party began to fall apart. Former functionaries left the 
Communist Party declaring themselves as open nationalists and channeling general 
dissatisfaction away from the option of unified Yugoslavia by blaming the 
neighboring republics for deteriorating living standards. Each of the republics held 
multi-party elections in 1990 with nationalist parties coming to the front. What 
followed was a prolonged and bloody breakup war between and within former 
republics, which lasted for a decade. 
 
4.1. (2) Change and Survival 
 
The Mexican state also appeared to be responding to 1968 by a return to the 
Revolutionary orthodoxy. After clamping down hard on the student movement, the 
system began to integrate many of the former dissidents in the 1970’s by taking on 
leftist rhetoric in international and domestic politics.288 During the presidency of Luis 
Echeverría (1970-1976), official Mexico spoke against the growing power of the 
multinationals, opposed Washington over Latin American issues and posed as a 
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champion of the developing world.289 Internally, there was an attempt to regain the 
popular support by expanding the state intervention and redistribution measures.290  
 
This tactic was also made easier by a discovery of substantial oil reserves in 1976 and 
readiness of international private banks to extend credit based on the surplus of 
petrodollars. Oil allowed Mexico’s exports to increase, however the ISI expansion 
and bulky government infrastructure raised the level of imports even more.291 By 
1981, the rise in the interest rates on dollar nominated loans and a drop in the price of 
oil put strain on Mexico’s Central Bank reserves. Recession in the U.S. and the world 
market made it increasingly difficult for Mexican industry to export and tourist sector 
to attract hard currency.292 In 1982, the new president Miguel de la Madrid 
(19821987) finished his first year in office with - 4.6 percent growth rate.293 At the 
same time, the national debt jumped form around $30 billion in 1977 to over $80 
billion by 1982.294 
 
Starting with the presidency of De La Madrid, the Mexican state fundamentally 
changed its economic orientation by agreeing to provisions of the international 
financial community for renegotiation of the soaring debt. Mexico obliged itself to 
open the economy and decrease the budget deficit from 18 percent of GDP in 1982 to 
3.5 percent in 1985.295 By the end of De La Madrid’s term, through selling, closing 
down, restructuring and merging, the government managed to dismantle some 706 
state owned companies from the 1,115 ones registered in 1982. It is estimated that 
these companies accounted for some 25 percent of the value of non-petroleum 
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manufacturing and 30 percent of the nation’s total employment.296 The next 
presidential term under Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) managed to cut the 
state ownership of companies down for additional 67 percent.297 Share of wages in 
total GDP fell from 40 percent in the 1970’s to 31.74 percent in 1996.298 With the 
galloping inflation and the abolition of price controls, it is estimated that the 
purchasing power of the working class was declining at the rate of 15 to 25 percent 
per year during the austerity measures of the 1980’s.299 Public expenditure on social 
welfare such as health and education decreased from 7.3 percent of the GDP in 1981 
to 3.2 percent in 1988. In 1992, the state ended the ejido as a form of land 
ownership.300 Apart from seriously disrupting social relations in the countryside, this 
act was symbolic as it put an end to an important ingredient of Mexican sense of 
historical uniqueness and the continuity of the Revolution.301 
 
The PRI was much less determined to recreate the state-society relationships than it 
was to transform the economy. Nevertheless, pressure from the private sector and 
mobilizations from below as well as the lack of alternative slowly pushed the PRI in 
the direction of political reforms. Peters mentions the founding of Consejo 
Coordinador Empresarial (CCE)302 in 1975 as the beginning of the process of 
abandonment of the PRI by the private sector and its increasing hostility towards the 
political legacy of the revolution.303 The government was unable to provide 
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macroeconomic stability any longer and the sclerotic ISI was becoming a 
straightjacket for further business growth of many inside the entrepreneurial class. 
This changing relationship was expressed in the rising importance of PAN and the 
pressure for electoral reform in 1977 which opened the door for increased political 
plurality.304 Inside the PRI itself, the presidency of De La Madrid, according to Ai 
Camp, marked the rise of a new breed of politicians.305 The so called technocrats 
distinguished themselves sharply from the old guard of PRI políticos. Born in the 
1940’s and 1950’s, they had no connection to the revolution or the years under 
Cárdenas, obtained high educational degrees from private universities in Mexico or 
the U.S. and saw the integration into the world market as the only solution for 
Mexico’s economic stagnation. The crisis of the political monopoly became obvious 
in 1988 presidential elections, when the PRI candidate Salinas de Gortari, came out as 
a tight winner among widespread accusations of electoral fraud.306 Upon proclaiming 
victory Salinas stated that the country is entering “a new political stage”.307  
 
It was under Salina’s term that the elites within the PRI started to consider 
modernization of the PRI by internal reorganization or complete elimination of the 
membership by sector in favor of individual participation. Significantly, the new 
social program entitled National Program of Solidarity (PRONASOL), aimed at 
mending the wounds of neo-liberal reforms, was implemented independent of the 
traditional PRI structures.308 The World Bank was pressuring the Mexican 
government to do away with, what they called, “labor market rigidities”309 as the best 
cure for international competitiveness and unemployment. Apart from the weakening 
of institutional support for the state-labor alliance, which was now seen as an obstacle 
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to further labor flexibility, the changing nature of the economy also partly undermined 
the old organized working class. The privatization process liquidated some 400,000 
unionized jobs.310 Peters shows that the new workplaces, created in export oriented 
economy, were concentrated mostly in non-manufacturing branches such as 
construction, trade, restaurants and hotels, educational services and other services, 
which generated some 68.7 percent of the new jobs in the period  between 1988 and 
1996.311 
 
In 2000, after 70 years of unbroken PRI rule, the power transfer went on smoothly as 
all the political actors recognized Vicente Fox, from the oppositional PAN, as the new 
president of Mexico. However, as Gonzalès points out, many Mexicans did not 
consider Fox’s government as the first of a new politico-economic era, he rather 
represented the fourth president of an extended period of deep economic liberalization 
that was laying to rest the social principles of the Mexican Revolution.312 
 
4.2. Reclaiming the Movements’ Autonomy  
 
The short term effect of 1960’s mobilizations was taming of the liberal forces by the 
state bureaucracies in both countries during the 1970’s. However, in what relation do 
later transformations in 1980’s and 1990’s stand to the student movements of 1968? 
The dominant interpretations are different in Yugoslavia and Mexico. The fact that 
Yugoslavia did not survive the transformation process makes the distinction line 
between the slogans of the 1960’s and the political tone accompanying civil wars in 
the 1990’s seem very clear. Replying to the question of what remains today from the 
1968 movement in Yugoslavia, Kanzleiter concludes that traces could be located in 
film and theater but not in any concrete political manifestation.313 By comparing the 
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1968 movement with the anti-Milosević student protests in Belgrade in the 1990’s, 
Robertson clearly presents stark differences in values and demands between the 
two.314 Finally, Ali and Watkins make the contrast between the 1968 aspirations and 
the outcome of the crisis of Yugoslav socialism even sharper by suggesting that if the 
structural reforms the students had demanded had been implemented, the citizens of 
Yugoslavia might have been spared of the traumas inflicted on them after Tito’s 
death.315  
 
In Mexico, on the other hand, the successful transition and survival of the 
establishment opened the doors for different historical interpretations. Analysis of the 
movement towards export oriented economy and liberal-democratic political system 
in the 1990’s is often connected with the 1968 student revolt in a straight line. Kastner 
and Mayer point out to the term “pyrrhic defeat” employed by the Mexican author 
Carlos Fuentes to describe this continuity.316 The existence of viable left wing 
political option in Mexican politics, willing to identify itself with the 1968 legacy, 
also contributes on its behalf to this reading. Contrary to these tendencies, I will 
attempt to establish the 1968 movements as historical narratives in their own right 
whose meaning can be appreciated primarily in the context of their time.  
 
4.2. (1) Unwanted Legacy 
 
The idea of continuity between the 1968 movement in Yugoslavia and the above 
described process of transition finds itself far from the mainstream discourses in 
Serbia of today. Reflecting on the interviews conducted with students, journalists and 
scholars in Belgrade in 2006, Robertson notes the presence of a widespread 
conviction that the students in 1968 “demanded more communism”.317, and therefore 
having little connection with the opposition movements building up before and 
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around the fall of the Iron Curtain. This point of view is not new. It had been 
dominant since the initial reaction of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1968, at that 
time dominated by the liberal wing, which characterized the ideas behind the protest 
as remnants of defeated conservative Stalinist tendencies inside the Yugoslav 
society.318 Arsić and Marković do a great job in describing the media frenzy inside 
Yugoslavia launched against the students who were labeled as “our Chinese” and 
accused of “the philosophy of equal bellies”.319 
 
On the other hand, ever since the initial accusations of the multiparty political agenda 
by Tito and the more conservative fraction of the Party, there are cautious but 
persistent attempts to rehabilitate the 1968 movement by integrating it into the 
contemporary liberal discourse of democratization. In an introduction to the 1990 
edition of the previously banned 1968 events diary320, a well known Belgrade 
publisher, Miroslav Dereta, argued that the time distance and the changed outlook of 
the post Cold War world present an opportunity to revise the attitude towards 1968 
and recognize it as the starting point of the changes taking place at that moment.321 
Dragović-Soso makes a point, by citing the former Praxis member, Nebojša Popov, 
that the lasting contribution of the 1968 student revolt is not reflected only in its left 
wing ideas, but also in its inherent demand for freedom of the press, protest and 
gathering of different streams of critical intelligentsia.322 Marković’s recent revisionist 
account of the 1968 political orientation which includes “equality of different forms 
of property rights” and “regulated market economy”323 should also be seen in this 
context.324 None of these attempts had much success in altering the prevailing notion 
of 1968 as a regressive move oh behalf of ideologically blinded youth. 
                                                 
318 Mirko Arsić, Dragan R. Marković, ’68. Studentski bunt i društvo,  Beograd, 1984, p. 136 
319 Mirko Arsić, Dragan R. Marković, ’68. Studentski bunt i društvo,  Beograd, 1984, p. 171 
320 It is the diary of one of the most prominent film directors of the Yugoslav 1960’s “black 
wave” film school, Živojin Pavlović, banned in 1984. 
321 Živojin Pavlović, Ispljuvak  pun krvi, Grafički Atelje Dereta, Beograd, 1990, p. 8 
322 Jasna Dragović-Soso, „Spasioci nacije“-Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljavanje 
nacionalizma, Fabrika Knjiga, Beograd, 2004, p. 56 
323 Mihailo Marković, Juriš na nebo, Prosveta, Beograd, 2008, p. 40 
324 The latest example of this tendency and the controversy surrounding it could be seen at the 
40th anniversary commemoration of the of the 1968 movement, taking place on in June 2008 
on the grounds of Belgrade University, when the meeting was interrupted by the protesting 
students claiming that those who participated in the nationalist break up of the country in the 
1990’s do not have the right to claim the legacy of 1968 any longer. See:  
 78
 
Tracking the origins of both of these interpretations back to the days of their 
conception, in the late 1960’s, helps in establishing the well deserved autonomy for 
the movement’s agenda and its proper relation to the transformation processes of the 
1980’s and 1990’s. Rusinow remarks that, at their time, the 1968 protagonists were 
equally rejected by the more liberal party politicians and intellectuals, who were 
hostile to student’s anti-market attitude, as well as Tito and the older Party leaders 
who took the movement’s cries against the lack of democracy as a serious threat.325 
At the heart of this argument lays the way in which the students viewed the Party 
bureaucracy as the common source for both streams relevant in the Yugoslav political 
scene to this very day- liberalism and nationalism. The political monopoly, according 
to Popov, was defended by all the sections of the ruling nomenklatura for different 
reasons. The political bureaucracy used it as the cover for their social privilege and 
the usurpation of power, the rising technocracy for the slow privatization of socialized 
means of production and the small but strengthening business class for classical 
entrepreneurialism.326  
 
For Robinson, in the perspective of a country torn down by ethnic conflicts in the 
1990’s, the most interesting and refreshing aspect of the 1968 movement is the fact 
that it was a pan-Yugoslav one.327 Unlike all the post-1968 movements inside 
Yugoslavia, the student protest successfully defended itself against challenges of 
division along national lines.328 So, in 1971, a ten day, nationalist inspired, student 
strike erupted in Zagreb in solidarity with the Croatian republican leadership’s clash 
with the central authorities demanding more sovereignty based on the full control of 
tax revenues collected in Croatia, recognition of Croatian as the sole official language 
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and more control over the flow of foreign currency.329 As a response, the faculty of 
Law in Belgrade organized open discussions which united Serbian nationalist leaning 
dissidents in opposition to further decentralization of the country.330 According to 
Popov, the defeat of the 1968 movement encouraged the technocracy and the 
entrepreneurial class to intensify its attacks against Tito and the old guard which was 
worn off in fights with the left opposition.331 After 1968, the question of the 
fundamental democratization of society was pushed back into the frame of balancing 
between the federation and national statehoods on the one side and the  bureaucratic 
control and freedom of the market on the other. 
 
In 1971, the Praxis group contributor Ljubomir Tadić discarded the alternatives this 
frame offers as fictitious and located the roots of burgeoning nationalism in the 
“suffocation of spontaneous action of the masses”.332 To these tendencies he 
counterpoised the Yugoslav working class as the only social layer whose genuine 
interests are connected with further implementation of self-management and survival 
of the unified state. Kanzleiter defines the 1968 movement as the proof that Yugoslav 
Revolution managed to anchor a significant layer of society to the ideas of unified 
Yugoslavia and communism, thus dismissing the idea of inevitable break-up of the 
country.333 
The students marching under the parole “We are the sons of the working people” in 
1968 in Belgrade, could therefore be interpreted as maybe the last cry of this section 
of the Yugoslav society retreating in front of the rising pressure from other classes 
favored by the liberal reforms. 
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4.2 (2) Contested Legacy 
 
The significance of 1968 movement in today’s Mexico can not be overstated. The 
persistent evocation, re-examination and fight over the legacy and the meaning of 
1968 confirm this. One year before becoming the first non-PRI elected President of 
the state, Vicente Fox did not miss the opportunity to include the 1968 events into his 
autobiography and condemn the government repression, even though he admittedly 
never took any interest in them at the time.334 In “Opening Mexico: The Making of a 
democracy”, Preston and Dillon set up 1968 as an episode in progressing 
democratization that found its “decisive step towards completion of democratic 
transition” in PAN’s presidential race victory.335 Borden takes a similar stance, 
indicating that even though the movement had been defeated, millions of young 
Mexicans, touched, in one way or the other, by the protest, continued to contribute in 
their individual ways until the election in 2000 “changed the course of Mexican 
politics”.336 Putting aside the obvious problem of drawing a straight line between the 
1968 movement and the presidential victory of a conservative candidate with neo-
liberal agenda, the question remains how justifiable it is to connect the social 
movements in the 1980’s and 1990’s to the 1968 heritage? 
 
In describing the grass root responses to neo-liberal attacks in the last two decades of 
the 20th century in Mexico, many scholars focus on the emergence of the so-called 
new social movements in which citizens with common agendas transcend traditional 
categories of class, interest, or clientelism, coalescing around alternative identities 
such as community membership, ethnicity, environment or gender.337 The declining 
capability of the state to push the modernization project further and satisfy the basic 
needs of its citizens witnessed the creation of parallel markets, black markets and 
informal economy in response. Similarly, the loss of leverage of official trade unions 
and peasant organizations in negotiations within the PRI re-emphasized the 
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importance of ethnic communities, religious or voluntary non-governmental 
organizations, grassroots democracy, self government and autonomy.338 
 
The failure of the government to respond adequately in the aftermath of the 1985 
earthquake in Mexico City is often taken as the event which catapulted local self-help 
organizations to the forefront of political organizing from below. Citizens organized 
informal networks to aid those in need from the disaster and rescue the victims of the 
earthquake.339 By the mid 1980’s, most cities developed similar community groups 
connected into a National Urban Popular Movement Coordinating Committee 
(CONAMUP).340 Borden points out how many 1968 veterans were struck by the 
similarities between these two movements at the time.341 Preston and Dillon, on the 
other hand, contrast the practical nature of these new community politics to “shrill, 
abstract radicalism practiced at the UNAM in 1968”.342  
 
While the political parties of the left and the trade union movement traditionally 
focused on the sphere of production and the work places, these newer organizations 
were concerned more with the sphere of consumption and were territorially organized. 
They concentrated on local issues such as access to land, housing, urban services, 
roads and power supply and were often skeptical toward political parties and older 
worker’s movement traditions.343 Another aspect of this new activism was its alleged 
absence of ideology and diffusion across class lines. Preston and Dillon describe 
“people from all levels of life”344 participating in this endeavor: human rights 
observers curbing abuses of the security forces, grassroots communities blocking 
destruction of forests, journalists investigating corporate corruption, neighborhood 
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groups mobilizing against criminal gangs etc. It leads them to conclude that Mexico 
went through a pluralistic transition with democracy not being “a victory of either left 
or the right, either liberals or conservatives”.345 
 
New peasant movements mirrored these urban mobilizations in many ways. 
Distribution and the right to land was the basic demand in the countryside since the 
days of the Revolution. Since the 1970’s however, the peasants increasingly defined 
their interests in terms of their role as producers and consumers, negotiating prices of 
agricultural commodities and demanding access to markets, credit and basic 
services.346 In January 1994, a rural rebellion occurred in the southern state of 
Chiapas which also exhibited many of these new features. Unlike the traditional 
Marxist influenced guerrilla movements, the EZLN claimed it had no interest in 
taking over state power. Instead, it advocated new forms of non-hierarchical 
organizing, regional autonomy and indigenous rights.347  
 
Another side of civic organizations was an attempt to channel the combined effort of 
these local initiatives into electoral strategy in order to get a more effective response 
from the regime.348 The strengthening of PAN on the right pulled the PRI in the 
direction of more determined liberal reform, therefore creating space for the left 
alternative on the political scene. A left fraction within the PRI took advantage of this 
situation and together with civic groups successfully ran its own candidate in 1988 
presidential elections. This political initiative was later formalized in Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD). In spite of delivering a strong punch to the reform 
course in the 1988 elections, the reluctance of civic organizations to incorporate 
themselves fully into the PRD slowed down the building up of the party as a nation-
wide political force.349 A more serious problem for the left in this period however was 
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its apparent failure to present a clear alternative to the liberalization campaign. With 
the collapse of the Stalinist regimes around the world and the loss of appeal of the old 
corrupt corporatist state structures, the left had no effective counter course to the well 
defined program of macroeconomic monetarist stabilization.350 
 
Petras points to the space, in the past occupied by socialist, nationalist and populist 
politicians as the breeding ground for ideas he labels as “post-Marxism”. According 
to him, some of the main characteristics of this train of thought are: negation of the 
entity of social classes with objective interests as too reductionist and introduction of 
diverse identities instead (race, gender, ethnicity, sexual preference etc.), substitution 
of the state and political parties as agents of social improvement with local struggles 
over local issues as the only democratic means of change, emphasis on self-help in 
attacking paternalism and dependence on the state etc.351 If one compares these ideas 
to the political orientation of students in 1968 elaborated in their program and 
demands352 the discontinuity, not denying the continuities on other levels, between 
these two eras becomes clear. The leadership of the 1968 movement accepted the 
struggles of the militant trade unions and the poor peasantry as the universal interest 
of the society as a whole and recognized the absence of an a unified political 
expression as one of the main deficits of the movement, not advantage.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 
 
Mabry makes a point out of a group of German leftist journalists, visiting Mexico at 
the time of the 1968 events, who were astonished how could a movement demanding 
the enforcement of the country’s constitution be rendered revolutionary? 353 Rusinow 
makes a similar assessment by writing about the “mutually accepted ground rules” 354 
between the students and bureaucracy in Yugoslavia. Both authors tend to deny the 
revolutionary edge to these two peripheral occurrences, a characteristic generally 
easily ascribed to 1968 movements in the center. A research taking this type of 
characterizations at face value might miss the essence of these mobilizations.  
 
Unlike many 1968 movements in the West, which fed of the negation of the system in 
its entirety, the specific historical experience of Yugoslavia and Mexico contributed to 
the shaping of what Kanzleiter calls an “affirmative revolt”.355 The students in 
Belgrade and Mexico City extracted their militancy exactly from reaffirmation of the 
values formally pursued by their own regimes. These students came to age at the peak 
of the phase of unprecedented social development. The post-revolutionary system 
made it possible for them to count as the first generation in their families able to 
obtain higher education in the countries traditionally overwhelmed by low social 
mobility and economic hardship. Alongside this institutional connection, the intimate 
relation, through personal experience or family stories, to the revolutionary period, 
enabled the students to identify with the official rhetoric and believe in the possibility 
of progress along the same lines. Instead of emphasizing the movements’ conciliatory 
attitude towards the regimes or connecting them with later liberalization waves in the 
1980’s and 1990’s, one can interpret the 1968 in Belgrade and Mexico City as 
genuine attempts to salvage the state-led projects of development and take them 
further by criticizing structural limitations to future expansion.   
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Another telling differentiation from the movements in Western Europe and the United 
States would be the less visible dividing line between the Old and the New Left in 
these two cases on the semi-periphery. While students in the Western metropolises 
openly discussed the possibility of other layers substituting the proletariat as the prime 
agent of revolutionary change356, their Yugoslav and Mexican colleagues remained 
much more orthodox in this matter, channeling the movements’ efforts for contact and 
recognition toward the industrial working class and the peasantry. Neither of them 
succeeded in this attempt though. In both cases the working class remained contained 
within the official structures, thus limiting the movement to intellectual minority with 
no institutionalized links to other sectors in society. Then again, my research also 
detected obvious influences of the ideas circulating within the New Left in the West. 
For instance, the mandates of representatives inside Action Committees in Belgrade 
and the CNH in Mexico City were limited to 48 hours and one week respectively, 
reflecting the growing influence of anarchism and direct democracy in the global 
1968.  
 
This insistence on the organizational autonomy proved to be the biggest crime of 
these movements in the eyes of ruling bureaucracies. For the Yugoslav self- 
management institutions or the Mexican corporate structures, any example of political 
organizing apart form the established channels of co-optation, was a dangerous 
challenge and threat to the stability of the system. In confronting them, the regimes 
used the well rehearsed tactics of combined repression and integration. In the 
Yugoslav case, the presence of a political figure with strong revolutionary integrity 
was used to co-opt the movement initially. This act was followed by repression 
against individual movement leaders in the years to come. In Mexico, the government 
used terror, shooting indiscriminately at the masses, in order to break the movement 
and then proceeded to integrate the individual dissidents during the next presidential 
term.  
 
The congruency of 1968 in these two cases is not coincidental. The climax of Cold 
War confrontations, marked by the Cuban missile crisis in the Western hemisphere 
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and the Prague Spring in the East, was met by a particular sensitivity inside the 
countries like Yugoslavia and Mexico which were carefully balancing on the edges of 
superpowers’ borders. Besides the fragile geopolitical environment, both countries 
were influenced by the economic processes spreading over the borders of nation 
states. It did not take long, after the initial post-revolutionary models of autarchic 
development, for these regimes to realize that participation in the world market is 
something that can not be avoided. Consequences of economic opening were similar 
in both cases, stirring up social contradictions which eventually found an outlet in the 
described revolts. 
 
My examination concentrated on the epicenters of 1968 in the two central cities. Of 
course, even though these movements had a strong urban character, their reach went 
far beyond the limits of the capitals. The deliberate spatial restriction of this thesis 
suggests the opening up of the narrative to other areas as a logical next step in the 
future research. In Mexico, the strike spread to schools and universities throughout the 
Republic as the students in the provinces undertook solidarity actions with their 
colleagues in Mexico City.357 At the same time, the Mexican countryside peasant 
population to whom the students primarily oriented politically, besides the working 
class, was informed about the content of the strike demands primarily through the 
government media and therefore often appeared hostile towards the students.358 In the 
Yugoslav case, the thesis only briefly touches upon the interaction between the 
University of Belgrade and the University of Zagreb, thus leaving plenty of space for 
looking at the intensity and nature of the recorded contacts with the students in the 
other republics.359 The interplay between the events in Belgrade and the solidarity 
actions in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana present a potentially refreshing approach in 
examining the Yugoslav national question.  
 
In the same vein, the conscious focus of this thesis on the political aspect of the 1968 
movement helped emphasize the discontinuity between these movements and the 
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transformations taking place in the 1980’s and the 1990’s as well as the new social 
movements arising in response to these changes. The inclusion of other aspects of 
1968 such as the new cultural patterns, empowering of women and the minority social 
groups or the reawakened insistence on the individual instead of the group would 
certainly make the presented divide seem much narrower.  
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Summary 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the mobilizations that shook Mexican and Yugoslav societies in 
1968. An attempt will be made to place both movements in the historical context of 
developing countries on the semi-periphery of the world system, developing through 
different, but converging socio-economic systems. Mexico, developing through 
Import Substitution Industrialization model alongside a political system with strong 
corporatist features, and Yugoslavia, with its one party political system and command 
socialist economy which included market incentives. The genesis of  these 1968 
movements, in contrast to similar protests in the Western metropolises, are analyzed 
against the background of late rapid urbanization, limits of state led  economic 
growth, strong revolutionary discourses present inside both countries as well as the 
influences of 1968 as a global phenomenon. 
 
In order to understand the political outlook, demands and achievements of these two 
movements, the paper looks at key peculiarities of the Mexican bourgeois corporatist 
state and the Yugoslav self-management brand of socialism and explores how these 
macro frames influenced the dynamics of various social classes within them. Special 
attention is dedicated to the labor movements, the rising middle layers and 
differentiations taking place within the seemingly monolithic ruling elite. The 1968 
movements are considered as surface expressions of deeper tectonic shifts taking 
place within these societies under the authoritarian façade of the Mexican/Yugoslav 
state and discover the nature of connections between 1968 movements and the 
profound changes these systems will go through two decades later- mirrored in the 
neo-liberal economic turn and political liberalization in Mexico and the breakdown of 
planned economy and the state system in Yugoslavia. The thesis also re-examines the 
nature of the often assumed connections between the 1968 movements and the 
profound changes these two systems would go through in the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
which are mirrored in the neo-liberal economic turn and political liberalization in 
Mexico and the breakdown of the planned economy and the unified state in 
Yugoslavia.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit konzentriert sich auf die Mobilisierungen im Jahr 1968, 
welche die mekanische und die jugoslawische Gesellschaft erschüttert haben. Der 
Versuch wird gemacht beide Bewegungen in ihrem historischen Kontext von 
Entwicklungsländern an der Semiperipherie des Weltsystems zu analysieren, sich 
entwickelnd durch unterschiedliche, aber konvergierende Sozio-ökonomische 
Systeme. Mexiko- sich entwickelnd durch ein Importsubstitions- 
Industrialisierungsmodell einhergehend  mit einem politischen Modell mit starken 
korporartiven Merkmalen, und Jugoslawien- mit seinem Einparteiensystem und der 
sozialistischen Planwirtschaft kombiniert mit Marktanreizen. Die Entstehung der 
1968er Bewegungen  in diesen beiden Ländern wird, im Unterschied zu ähnlichen 
Protesten in den westlichen Metropolen, analysiert vor dem Hintergrund der späten 
Urbanisierung, der Begrenzungen von staatlich gelenktem wirtschaftlichen 
Wachstum, starker revolutionärer Diskurse präsent in beiden Ländern, sowie auch der 
Einflüsse von 1968 als globales Phänomen. 
 
Um die politische Orientierung, Forderungen und Errungenschaften dieser beiden 
Bewegungen zu verstehen, betrachtet die Arbeit Schlüsselbesonderheiten des 
mexikanischen bürgerlich- korporatistischen Staates und der jugoslawischen Marke 
des Sozialismus der Selbstverwaltung, und erforscht wie diese Macro-Rahmen die 
Dynamiken der verschiedenen in ihnen existierenden sozialen Klassen beeinflusst 
haben. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird den Arbeiterbewegungen, der aufsteigenden 
Mittelschicht und den Diffenzierungen innerhalb der scheinbar monolitischen 
herrschenden Elite geschenkt. Die 1968er Bewegungen werden gesehen als 
oberflächliche Ausdrücke tieferer tektonischer Verschiebungen, welche in diesen 
Gesellschaften unter der autoritären Schale des mexikanischen und des 
jugoslawischen Staates stattfanden. Die Arbeit stellt außerdem die Annahme eines 
Zusammenhangs zwischen den 1968er Bewegungen und den späteren profunden 
Veränderungen, sprich die neolibrale Wende und die politische Liberalisierung in 
Mexiko, und der Zusammenbruch der Planwirtschaft und des Staatssystems in 
Jugoslawien, in Frage. 
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